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This thesis is a descriptive case study of the contributions made by TransAfrica
Forum to the struggle to dismantle the Apartheid laws, codes, and customs that oppressed
the black Africans, Indians, Malays, and Chinese of South Africa. The study shows how
TransAfrica was a key player in a global anti-Apartheid movement and anti-racism
struggle, and how the organization was, from an historical standpoint, an impressive
example of Pan-African activism. Today, TransAfrica remains a vibrant organization,
which has formed alliances with other anti-Apartheid entities, encouraged progressive
and influential individuals to participate in the movement, and coalesced with traditional
civil rights organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC), Washington Office on
Africa (WOA) and the American Committee on Africa (ACA).
This descriptive case study seeks to show how TransAfrica's activism restored
energy to a worldwide freedom movement for South Africa through lobbying efforts;
demonstrations around the world; mobilization of public officials, students, entertainers;
and solicitation of involvement from political activists both here and abroad. The study
also specifies that the global anti-Apartheid movement against injustices shares clear
similarities with the struggles ofUnited States citizens during the Jim Crow era (1876 to
1964) in the southern United States. A close examination of analogous factors appears to
indicate that both black South Africans and black Americans resided in racist police
states in which law authorities were responsible for enforcement ofunfair economic and
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social policies. Furthermore, all governmental hierarchies in the American South and
South Africa utilized a combination of terrorism and legal pronouncements to control
African-Americans and black South Africans. Constitutional disenfranchisement,
inculcation of fear, random lynching, discretionary incarceration, intimidation of families
and children, and assassination, along with torture of key leadership, were among the
more effective control tactics. The racist codes, rules, and conditions that limited the
economic, social, and political advancement ofAfrican-Americans during this period are
very obviously akin to the Apartheid codes, rules, and conditions that subjugated the
people of South Africa. Black Africans were limited in a number of ways in their
movement towards full and equitable citizenship and former slaves in the United States
were restricted in a similar way. Indeed, Lerone Bennett underscores legal oppression in
the United States by discussing the so-called “black codes,” which were enacted during
the Reconstruction Period from 1865 to 1873 to establish control over all aspects of
African-American life:
The codes set up a complex system of social, economic, and political
controls. They dealt with labor contracts, apprenticeships, migration,
vagrancy, civil and legal rights-every facet of black life. Black children
separated from their parents could be made into quasi-slaves. Blacks
could come into courts and testify as witnesses only in cases in which
blacks were involved. Blacks could not possess firearms. Their
employment was often limited to contract labor.'
'Lerone Bennett, Jr., Reconstruction To Supreme CourtDecision 1954 (Chicago: Johnson Publishing Company,
1971), 9.
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Lerone Bennett’s analysis of the black codes suggests strong similarities with South
Africa’s official policy toward non-whites during the difficult period of Apartheid from
1948 to 1986, a period that involved arrest, violence, forceful removal, and discrimina¬
tion against people of color.
Furthermore, the research also indicates that in both the United States, but
particularly in South Africa, the entire oppressive schemata depended upon the support of
American government and other Western interests because of the strategic location,
strategic resources, and strategic importance of South Africa during the Cold War. This
tension between the United States and Soviet Union was a war without direct
confrontation. The 1947 election resulted in the implementation ofwhite minority rule by
the conservative, extremist Afrikaner National Party, with the government officially
supporting a unique political system called “Apartheid” that segregated black South
Africans politically, socially, and economically in all phases of life. The results were
profits in a high wage economy that benefited the government, the corporations, and
white citizens throughout the region. Also, South African rulers ran or influenced
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Namibia, and the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and
Angola, destabilizing the political situation throughout Southern Africa. Black South
Africans were consigned to a life of poverty, degradation, and existence without a
political voice in their own land.
This case study of TransAfrica is organized in the following manner; Chapter
Two reviews pertinent literature concerning TransAfrica and the struggle for self-
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determination in the United States and South Africa. An historical analytical approach
(also a component of a descriptive study) focuses on the efforts ofAfrican-Americans to
affect United States foreign policy prior to TransAfrica. It focuses on past efforts, from
Frederick Douglass to Andrew Young, to influence foreign policy in the United States.
The research also cites several studies that explore the influence ofAfrican-Americans on
foreign policy.
Chapter Three elucidates the history, mission, goals, objectives, structure and
operations ofTransAfrica. For example, one objective ofTransAfrica activists in 1972
was to lobby members of the United States Congress. TransAfrica collected, analyzed,
and disseminated information about the impact ofU.S. foreign policy on Africa and the
Caribbean, with a special focus on South Africa. The results were not immediate, but
interest grew as the years passed. Concomitantly, TransAfrica formed alliances with the
worldwide anti-Apartheid movement and stressed the passage ofanti-Apartheid
legislation. This form of political activity challenged the racist laws, ordinances, and
decrees and forced a closer examination ofU.S. foreign policy objectives in South Africa.
The extent to which lobbying and mobilization by TransAfrica contributed to the struggle
to dismantle Apartheid in South Africa is a primary focus of this study and demonstrates
that TransAfrica was not just a special interest or lobbying group but a viable, committed
force for economic, political and social change in South Africa.
5
Another example of TransAfrica’s contribution to black South African liberation
and also adherence to its goals and objectives can be seen in specific activities that took
place from 1984 to 1988. Again, under the leadership ofExecutive Director Randall
Robinson, TransAfrica became even more actively involved with the anti-
Apartheid movement increasing protests and demonstrations in the United States from
1984 to 1986. It also appears that TransAfrica contributed significantly to the efforts of
black South Africans, struggling along with the indigenous movement and working in
harmony to force change on the Apartheid regime. The research shows that indigenous
movement goals and activities were reinforced by boycotts, marches, and sit-ins in the
United States, strategies that had been effectively employed there during the fifties and
sixties. According to David McKean:
There are obviously many factors which will influence the eventual
outcome and timetable for change in South Africa. Of those factors, one of
the most important is the black resistance movement. While the exiled
African National Congress had traditionally been viewed as the strongest
and most popular black organization in the country, other important black
groups in the country, include Inkatha, AZAPO and the Pan Africanist
Congress.^
Some organizations that will be highlighted in this thesis include the African
National Congress, Inkatha, Pan-Africanist Congress, Azanian People’s Organization,
Congress of South African Students and the United Democratic Front, because
TransAfrica recognized that these organizations were on the front line in the South
African struggle for human rights. Chapter Three of this thesis also presents an analysis
^David McKean, “The UDF and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle, ” 7>aw5/l^<?a Fon/m 1, l(Fall 1986),31-43.
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of a United States policy towards South Africa dubbed “constructive engagement.”
According to Magubane:
Constructive engagement clearly was not aimed at helping the black popu¬
lation of South Africa rid itself of the oppressive and exploitative white
minority regime; rather, it was designed to pre-empt Soviet-backed
revolutionary change and to find ways to incorporate South Africa as a
respected member of the Western defense system in the struggle against
Soviet expansionism. It meant aligning, even more openly, U S. interests
with the racist regime under the pretext that this was the way to nudge
South Africa toward reform.^
TransAfrica was founded to change U S. foreign policy in Africa and especially
South Africa. Indeed, TransAfrica’s alliance with black South Africans and its role as a
conduit for change in U S. foreign policy was codified in the organization’s policy
statements. TransAfrica was concerned with how the constructive engagement policy
helped to maintain Apartheid. My research on this policy indicates that the United States
supported a continuation of previous policies in order to expand commercial, strategic,
and military interests. TransAfrica opposed constructive engagement because it strangled
the life and blood ofblack South Africans.
In Chapter Four, this study further details how lobbying and mass mobilization
helped to dismantle Apartheid in South Africa. The study contends that TransAfrica
consistently lobbied, over a period of ten years plus, for a change in the so-called
“constructive engagement” policy, for a re-consideration ofUnited States support of an
anti-democratic government, and for a re-evaluation of the efficacy of massive corporate
^Bernard Magubane, “Reagan euid South Africa,” TransAfrica Forum, 6, Numbers 3 and 4 (SjHing-Summer 1989),
48.
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profits at the expense of an oppressed underclass. Also, Chapter Four demonstrates that
civil disobedience, boycotts, and stay-at-home strikes contributed to undermining
Apartheid and that TransAfrica supported a global anti-Apartheid movement, which at
the urging of TransAfrica, utilized non-violent strategies. The research indicates as well
that TransAfrica set up chapters, added members, and recruited students from various
colleges and universities to energize and engage a younger demographic. Through panel
discussions, conferences, resolutions, and debates, TransAfrica expanded the global
struggle against Apartheid to include the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France,
all ofwhich had supported Apartheid in the quest for cheap labor and huge profit. Lastly,
the demonstrations and other logistical tactics organized by TransAfrica, which
eventually stimulated interest and action against the government of South Africa through
and by powerful constituencies, sought to focus pressure on international organizations
such as the United Nations and European Community and succeeded in doing so.
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Central Question
What specific contributions did TransAfrica make to the global movement to end
Apartheid in South Africa?
Hypothesis
The research hypothesis is that TransAfrica made significant contributions,
domestically and internationally, to the anti-Apartheid movement from 1977 to 1986, and
thereby helped to dismantle Apartheid in South Africa. The specific contributions made
by TransAfrica include: (1) the encouragement of an international protest framework
designed to dismantle the existing South African political and economic system (2) the
lobbying ofCongress for the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986
(3) the mobilization of churches, African-American leaders, students, organizations,
groups, athletes, entertainers, ordinary citizens and unions to hold demonstrations all over
the nation and (4) the utilization ofmedia to disperse information favorable to the goals
ofTransAfrica.
Data Collection
To research the contributions of TransAfrica, two kinds of data, primary and
secondary, were examined. Primary data is “the most valid, the most illuminating, and
the most truth-manifesting.”'’ Primary data is also “value-free so to reflect the truth about
'’Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis, Practical Research Planning andDesign (New York: Prentice-Hall, 2001), 95.
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historical events.”^ Thus, the use ofprimary data "strengthens the integrity and credibility
of the research study.”® Secondary data is “derived not from the truth itself, but from the
primary data.”^ An analysis of primary and secondary data was conducted to test the
hypothesis that TransAfrica made significant contributions to the anti-Apartheid
movement. Secondary data for this study was gathered from such works as Defending
The Spirit: A Black Life inAmericd written by Executive Director Randall Robinson and
An Interview with Randall Robinson: State OfThe U.S. Anti-ApartheidMovement!^
In addition, primary data came from the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM)'°
and Protest Chronologyf Public Law 99-440, Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986'^ and Comprehensive Anti-ApartheidAct Amended with H.R. 1580 of 1988. This




*RandaU Robinson, Defending the SpiritA Black Life in America (New York: Penguin Group, 1999^, 81-165.
^Randall Robinson, "A Conversation With Randall Robinson,” interview by FrankMcCoy The Crisis, (November,
1986) 93 9: 490.
' °Free South African Movement(FSAM),77ie Washington Post, Wednesday, October 23, 1991, A40.
''Protest Chronology, The Washington Post, Wednesday, November 27, 1985, Bl.
'^Congress House, Subcommitte On Foreign Affairs, Oversight OfThe Administration’s Implementation OfThe
Comprehensive Anti-ApartheidAct of1986(Public Law 99-440)AndOfAn RecentSouth African PoliticalAndEconomic
Developments: Hearing before Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, lOff^ Cong, /'’session, 16 June 1987, 1.
'^Congress, House, and Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Anti-ApartheidActAmendments of
1988: Hearing before the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, lOiP Cong. 2nd session. 12 July 1988, 2.
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Febmary 17-20, 1987 of initiating of the FSAM, overriding of President Reagan’s veto
by Congress, and internationalizing action against the South African government through
the United Nations.
Secondary data was obtained from books such as Foreign Policy and the Black
International Interest, and NelsonMandela, TheMan and theMovemenT^ as well as
from articles in the journal, TransAfricaForumData collected during a visit to
Washington D C ., at the Arthur Ashe International Library and Library ofCongress is an
important part of the research. To demonstrate that TransAfrica contributed to the
dismantling ofApartheid in South Africa, data were gathered from the TransAfrica
Forum'\ congressional records on U S. House and Senate debates on South Africa,
articles from major newspapers, the Galileo database, books, press releases, and special
reports.
The analysis of data collected on TransAfrica’s role specifies how and why the
direction of U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa changed. The research reveals the
nature ofTransAfrica's testimony before Congress, as well as the tactics used to influence
‘"'Charles Henry, Foreign Policy and The Black International Interest (New York: State University ofNew York
Press, 2000), 112.
‘^ary Benson, NebonMandela theMan and theMovement,(HewYork: W:W. Norton & Company, 1985), 226.
‘^BernardMagubane, “Reagan and South Africa,” TransAfrica Forum, 6,3 and 4 (Spning-Summer 1989), 48.,
‘^Ibid.
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this branch of government. Also highlighted are the legislative battles that TransAfrica
faced in initiating anti-Apartheid legislation in Congress. The data provides an overview
of the Free South Africa Movement from 1984 to 1986 and the influence TransAfrica had
on this movement. The data explains the relationship between lobbying and mobilization
of bias, two critical factors that contributed to the passage of anti-Apartheid legislation in
Congress. Domestic and international activities of TransAfrica are revealed in the data
and support to the validity of the hypothesis. To substantiate many conclusions within
this study and to confirm that the activities of TransAfrica influenced Congress, most
research authenticates that a combination of TransAfrica strategies helped lead to
political, economic and social change in South Africa. This study indicates that
TransAfrica engaged House leaders, influential Senators, and forged relationships with
traditional organizations such as NAACP, SCLC, labor organizations, and the Coalition
of black Trade Unionists, which offered substantial support of various kinds to the
significantly underpaid workers in South Africa, both male and female.
The research shows that in America, TransAfrica organized students, civil rights
activists, actors, entertainers, and athletes all of whom participated in organized social
protests. In an international context, TransAfrica worked with such individuals and
groups as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the African National Congress, the American
Committee on Africa, and the Washington Office on Africa. TransAfrica also
participated in anti-Apartheid conferences in Geneva, London, Toronto, and Amsterdam.
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In evaluating the lobbying techniques used by TransAfrica in its efforts to
influence Congress, three strategies were examined: (1) testifying to committees, (2)
establishing working relationships, and (3) shaping the legislation. After examining these
elements, the research was able to determine how the lobbying techniques implemented
by TransAfrica contributed to anti-Apartheid legislation.
In summary, the major portion of this thesis is a three-part descriptive case study.
Chapter Two entails a review of literature on the impact of African-Americans in U.S.
foreign policy prior to the existence of TransAfrica and reviews the African-American
roles in the seminal events leading to the downfall of Apartheid. Chapter Three examines
the origins and evolution of TransAfrica and its role in filling a gap in the anti-Apartheid
movement. Chapter Four explores the question of “mobilization of bias” for a new policy
in South Africa.
Operational Concepts
To substantiate the hypothesis that TransAfrica made significant contributions to
the dismantling of Apartheid in South Africa, on the domestic and international level,
several operational concepts are utilized. The first operational concept is “mobilization of
bias.” “Mobilization of bias” is defined as the ability to marshal resources and opinions in
an effective manner. It also refers to “coalition, formation, and promotion of
congressional ties.”'* "Mobilization ofbias," as suggested by Magubane, relates to:
'*David Dickson, “American Society And The Afiican-American Foreign Policy Lobby,” Journal OfBlack
Studies, 27,2, (November 1996), 139-151.
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Strong action against Apartheid from students, churches, African A-
merican leaders, and nation-wide demonstrations spearheaded by Trans-
Africa. In other words, TransAfrica led an effort in mobilizing bias
including public opinion, particularly among African Americans against
Apartheid through such actualities as divestments, appeals,
demonstrations, protests, workshops, sit-ins, and publications on the
problem of Apartheid in South Africa.’®
The second operational concept is “degree of impact.” To operationalize the
“degree of impact,” three possible levels of impact will be examined. The first degree of
impact is designated “high,” and measures the extent to which TransAfrica directly
influenced the United States Congress to pass anti-Apartheid legislation. As a case in
point, TransAfrica worked directly and consistently with members of Congress, the
White House and State Department to change or influence conditions in South Africa.
The second degree of impact is designated “medium” and measures TransAfrica's
connections with organizations such as the African National Congress and the
Organization of African Unity from 1977 to 1986. TransAfrica sought to make alliances
that would benefit the liberation movement. The third degree of impact is termed “low”
and describes the inability of the Subcommittee on African Affairs to produce Anti-
Apartheid legislation during the period of 1977 to 1986. Though TransAfrica made a
determined and disciplined effort to change attitudes about this strategic part of the
world, it was not always successful in its attempts.
'^Bernard Magubane, “Reagan And South Africa,” TransAfrica Forum. 6, 3, and 4, (Spring-Summer 1989), 48.
14
The third major concept employed is “political oppression,” which according to
Isaac Prilletnsky and Lev Gonick is defined as:
The creation of material, legal, military, economic, and, or other social
barriers to the fulfillment of self-determination, distributive justice, and
democratic participation, results from the use ofmultiple forms ofpower by
dominating agents to advance their own interests at the expense of persons or
groups in positions of relative powerlessness.^®
The fourth major operational concept applied in this research is “economic
exploitation.” Claude Ake has succinctly defined some key terms, including “economic
exploitation”:
The proletariat class has nothing but labor power, lives only by the
permission of the bourgeoisie, for if the bourgeoisie refuses to buy its
labor power, it will soon starve. When the worker sells his labor power he
submits to exploitation. The relation of exploitation between capitalist and
worker comes out more clearly, when we reduce capital to its two
components. One is constant capital. This is that part of the investment of
the capitalist in non-personal factors such as raw materials, machinery and
transportation. This part of capital is said to be constant capital because
the value of these factors of production remain the same through the
production process and are merely transformed. The second component of
capital is variable capital. This is the personal factor of production, which
is the part which brings the increase in value of capital. All the capitalist
profit or surplus value is created solely by the labor of the worker .^'
The concept of “influence” is also important in this study, and is defined as
“getting people to do things they otherwise would not do.”“ To operationalize influence.
^°Isaac Prilletnsky and Lev Gonick, “Political change oppression remains: On the psychology and politics of
oppression, ” (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University, 1994), 5.
Ake, Apolitical Economy ofAfrica, Longman Group, 1981), 14& 15.
Webster's Ninth New CollegiateDictionary (Springfield: Merriam-Webster, 1980), 620.
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data were analyzed that documented TransAfrica’s meetings with key persons in the
Senate, House ofRepresentatives, State Department, and White House. To measure
TransAffica's influence, this thesis reviewed the American policy towards South Africa
during the above named timeframes. The data suggest that the White House and Congress
acknowledged TransAfrica and its expertise on South Africa by seeking its opinion in
meetings and conferences before going public with matters relating to Apartheid. The
research also shows that on matters relating to South Africa, TransAfrica was the
organization most called upon by Congress, White House, and State Department because
of its expertise, knowledge, and specialization. To substantiate this contribution, the
number of press releases, testimonies, and meetings with governmental officials
regarding foreign policy were examined.
One other way to determine its influence is by exploring the success of the
organization in bringing substantive issues to the attention of the White House and
Congress, and the fact that TransAfrica could rally support over ethnic and political lines.
To measure TransAfrica’s contribution, the study examined the success of the Free South
Africa Movement and its political activities during the pivotal year of 1984, public
demonstrations throughout the country, the number of people arrested, grassroots
campaigns over the country, members of the U S. Senate and House ofRepresentatives
who changed or influenced opinions, and civil rights and labor leaders who used their
influence to facilitate change. One ofthe ways a person or group influences foreign
policy is to testify before Congress and/or present position papers on specific areas of
foreign policy. Other ways to influence policy makers is to promote the economic.
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political, and social benefits of a policy adjustment, and to meet with members of
Congress and Congressional committees, which establishes a personal rapport.
A final concept that is important to this study is the notion of “lobbying.” One of
the ways TransAfi-ica garnered votes and support for black South African advancement
was lobbying members ofCongress. In providing an operational definition of lobbying,
Wolpe and Levine stated that, “Lobbying elicits support for a particular position, to
encourage opposition to an unfolding event, to provide an alert (with your perspective on
it) in anticipation of fiiture events, and to get a vote.”^^ The process itself involves the
promotion of an issue by lobbyists who influence opinions and present information about
and solutions to an issue. “If successful, the lobbyist lays the foundation for a long term
strategy that will advance their agenda.”^'* TransAffica defined the issue and knew its
strategic goals. The organization connected with key players in Congress, studied how
they operated, and knew their positions on a number of issues. TransAJfrica also
recognized the role of key committees in pushing for legislation against Apartheid.




The research methodology is: 1) analyzing past and present material within the
scope of the thesis, 2) unifying key concepts in an easily understood form, and 3)
utilizing only data relating to the thesis. The primary methodology employed was to
study carefully and extrapolate information from the published works ofRandall
Robinson: Defending The Spirit: A Black Life in America and An Interview with Randall
Robinson: State Of The US. Anti-ApartheidMovement, Free South Movement (FSAM)
and Protest Chronology. The thesis is valid when it measures the contributions of
African-Americans in the descriptive case study.
Theoretical Framework
There are several theoretical frameworks for understanding international relations.
One of the approaches is the realist theory which states that “countries operate in their
own self-interests and that politics is a struggle for power.”^ Another approach is Marxist
theory which frames a second interpretation: that the United States and South Africa
promoted their self interests for military-strategic, raw materials, and profits, with racism,
deprivation, and exploitation of black South Africans the unfortunate result. I applied
both these analytical approaches to the examination of U S. foreign policy in South
Africa. I conducted research in this thesis within the sub-fields of international relations
and American domestic policy as conducted by both the Democratic and Republican
parties for most of the last century. To retrieve core data, I traveled to Washington, D.C.
^^John T. Rourke, International Politics on the WorldStage, (Guilford: The Dushkin Group, 1988), 541.
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and visited the headquarters of TransAffica. A number of documents on TransAffica are
available at the Arthur Ashe International Library at 545 8**’ Street SE #200 Washington,
DC 20003. I also visited the campus ofHoward University in Washington, D C. to learn
more about the role of TransAfrica. Dr. Ronald Walters, one of the founders of
TransAffica and a former faculty member ofHoward University, donated papers, articles,
and press releases on the history of TransAfrica to the Arthur Ashe International Library.
Howard University also houses the papers of former Congressman Charles Diggs, who
chaired the House of Representatives Committee on Sub-Sahara Africa, and who tried,
for years, to pass legislation condemning South Africa’s system ofApartheid.
In addition, I visited the Library of Congress to find relevant material and
researched the field of international relations, for which there were literally thousands of
documents. One of these documents confirmed that President Kwame Nkrumah’s
Africanized Marxist theory of “economic imperialism” is vital and important in
understanding U S. foreign policy in South Africa. This theory helps to explain the
actions and motives of previous U.S. policies in South Africa and postulates that, behind
U S. policies, are economic interests that were considered to be more important to the
interests of the United States than human rights objectives in South Afi-ica. After in-depth
analysis of U.S. policy in South Afi'ica, one of Kwame Nkxumah’s theories seems to
provide one of the best theoretical approaches for understanding policies in South Africa
during the period in question.
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One particularly applicable element of this approach asserts that
underdevelopment creates conditions of disparity between the “haves” and “have-nots.”
Colonialism is a system that creates a ruler-exploited labor/worker relationship and
fosters a level of dependency in the oppressed. Such a system also perpetuates a structure
in which there is a dominant group and a weaker group and is a subtext to a capitalist
economic system as described by Marx and Engels. A Marxist approach illustrates how
black South African labor was exploited during the Apartheid era and how the interests of
the U.S. and South Africa were benefited by paying the workers meager wages. Using
these measurements of wage deprivation, exploitation, and manipulation, it is clearly
recognized that these conditions existed in South Africa among black South Africans.
On the other hand, Kwame Nkrumah points out in Class Struggle in Africa that a
Marxist economic interpretation is simply an analysis of a new form of imperialism. This
point ofview is cogent to the thrust of the research in that it illustrates the relationship of
government, corporations, and military in maintaining the economic system of Apartheid.
Nkrumah postulates that:
New methods of neocolonialism are economic control, in the forms of aid,
loans, trade, and banking, the strangle hold of indigenous economies
through vast international interlocking corporations, political direction
through puppet governments, social penetration through the cultivation of
an indigenous bourgeoisie, the imposition ofdefense agreements and the
setting up of military and air bases, and ideological expansion through
mass communications.^®
^®K\vame Nkrumah, Class Struggle inAfrica, (New York; International Publishers, 1984), 70-71.
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I will contend that Nkrumah’s interpretation is relevant in that South Africa’s highly
profitable economy was exploited, not just by overt government policies and investment
agreements, but also by discrete diplomatic negotiations that favored the interests of
European countries and the United States; that supported international corporations,
many from the U.S.; that promoted military and defense alliances which helped maintain
control of black South Africa; and that ignored the fimneling of direct foreign aid which
supported the political and economic structures undergirding Apartheid.
This thesis explains American foreign policy in South Africa and presents a
framework that illustrates the role of TransAfrica in ending Apartheid. About this
relatively new form of imperialism, Fann and Hodges emphasize that, “The advantage of
U.S. imperialism over the old model is that it permits economic domination within the
scope of international law.”^’ Specifically, the above described theoretical framework will
examine how TransAfrica promoted a global anti-Apartheid and anti-racism struggle, and
how its role in international relations changed the construct of western economic
relationships with the South African government.
^’K.T. Fann and Donald Hodges, Readings in U.S. Imperialism, (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971), vi.
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Research Delimitations
The parameters of the problem involve dates ranging from the arrival of the Dutch
in 1652 until 1990 the year of official cessation of Apartheid laws. Moreover, the
researcher has chosen the year of the formation of TransAfrica (1977) as the year when
significant change began to take place regarding the struggles in South Africa. In this
study, the years of 1986 to 1988 are also pivotal in that specifically targeted populations
of African-Americans were mobilized by TransAfrica and United States foreign policy
on South African exhibited a definite inclination toward change. There are some
uncontrollable variables in studying the impact of TransAfrica on U.S. foreign policy,
such as classified information from the State Department, Defense Department, and
National Security Agency. The study, however, will examine how TransAfrica
contributed to the changing ofU.S. foreign policy without assistance from these agencies




In this chapter, the descriptive case study analysis will show that African
Americans did, to some extent, influence United States foreign policy prior to the
existence ofTransAfrica. One of the components of the descriptive case employed in this
study is historical analysis. Historical analysis utilizes existing studies, evaluates data,
and determines the validity of research assumptions. Initially, then, Henry Jackson
shows that the participation of African Americans goes back as far as “January 1, 1817 in
American Colonization of Free People of Color of the United States Society.”^* This
society tried to relocate African Americans who were free, rebellious, and outspoken to
Africa. Jackson states that “it represented the second major policy of U S. government
toward Africa following the original involvement with the Barbary States of North
Africa.”^® He recognizes that the American Colonization Society was comprised of a
mixed group ofpeople. Dr. Jackson states:
The society was maintained by a paradoxical mixture of three different
groups: Black nationalists, who longed for homeland free of slavery;
White abolitionists, who regarded slavery as inherently evil and saw
African repatriation as an expedient relief from it; and slaveholders, who
welcomed African colonization as a convenient way to expel slaves who
had become too aged or enfeebled to work, not to mention those slaves
whose smoldering hatred of oppression made them a permanent threat to
White society. In the American Colonization Society these disparate
^*Dr. Henry F. Jackson, From The Congo To Soweto: U.S. ForeignPolicy TowardAfrica Since I960; (New York:




elements found common ground, with the result that Bushrod Washington
and slaveholders deliberated with such free black leaders as Alexander
Crummell, an Episcopal clergyman educated in England at Cambridge
University, and Paul Cuffe, a wealthy Massachusetts ship-owner who, at
his own expense, sent thirty-eight freedmen to the British colony of Sierra
Leone in 1815 .^“
Jackson explains that one of the ways for African-Americans to influence the foreign
policy establishment during that time was to acknowledge the land of their forefathers.
Jackson discovers in From The Congo To Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa
Sincel960:
From the American Colonization Society of the nineteenth century to
TransAfrica today, blacks have continued in their efforts to influence
American policy toward Africa, not always in unison, sometimes with
contradiction, and infrequently with success. Blacks have sought to use
American power in the interest of their ancestral homeland.^'
Jackson shows that prior to TransAfrica, African-Americans indicated a degree of interest
in foreign policy partially because of an implicit spiritual and racial connection to an
ancestral homeland. To continue influencing the foreign policy establishment, the
literature shows that selected African-Americans were placed in some position of
responsibility. This literature review reveals that participation in the diplomatic service
was one of the ways to influence foreign policy.
In the latter part of the nineteenth-century, between 1889 and 1893, the State




The Diplomatic Correspondence of U.S. Minister Frederick Douglass from Haiti, 1889-
1891, Norma Brown states:
In Douglass’ day the diplomatic service appointed Negroes to positions of
more responsibility than in other branches of federal service. In the quarter
century before 1900 more than a dozen black Americans became ministers
to Haiti and Liberia, posts which came to be known as the Negro beat.^^
Brown points out that African-Americans in foreign policy were very high profile in the
State Department, especially from 1869 to 1889. In her work, she highlights notable
people. Brown confirms that:
Frederick Douglass was the third black man to serve as United States
Minister to Haiti. Ebenezer Don Carlos Bassett, America’s first official
Negro diplomat, was sent to Haiti by Ulysses S. Grant and served there
from 1869 to 1877. Douglass’ immediate predecessor in Haiti, John E.W.
Thompson, also a Negro, filled that post from 1885 to 1889.^^
By serving in these capacities, African-Americans in the nineteenth century
participated in the foreign policy process as diplomats in Haiti and Liberia. In fact, the
book African-Americans in International Affairs illustrates how African-Americans
literally demanded a role in foreign policy. Frederick Douglass, specifically, led the fight
for African-Americans to influence policy affecting Haiti and Liberia. At the Eighth
Annual Foreign Policy Conference on June 9, 1989, Congressman Mfume, who was a
panel participant stated:
^^Norma Brown, A BlackDiplomat In Haiti The Diplomatic Correspondence ofU.S. MinisterFrederick
Douglassfrom Haiti, 1889-18931, (Salisbury; Documentary Publications, 1977), 1.
”rbid.,n.
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Following emancipation there were a number of blacks who had worked
to get President Grant elected and then exacted the right to have some sort
of influence on public policy. Frederick Douglass led that fight, getting
two people appointed to Foreign Service posts and he ultimately served as
Foreign Service officer.
Douglass clearly laid a foundation for future participation by African-Americans
in modem foreign policy. Daniel Brantley stated in Black Americans As Participants In
The Foreign Service. “In the State Department, the people with the best jobs who sat in
on the important discussions about foreign affairs were white males exclusively recmited
from the nation’s ethnic elite.”^^ In the earlier years, blacks who desired the chance to
participate in foreign policy had a difficult time. Elliot P. Skinner notes that a problem
with influencing the State Department and policymakers who carried out foreign policy is
that African-American political organizations and spokespersons were often ignored or
given high profile positions, but no actual power. Skinner states that “despite the fact that
black American leaders have long attempted to participate in the foreign policy of the
United States, their efforts have not been recognized or well-rewarded.^^ During this
period, they were largely excluded from participating because of elitism, racism, and
sexism.
In addition, African-Americans were locked out of the formal channels of the
foreign policy establishment such as the White House, Congress, and the State
^"'TransAfrica Forum Conference, African Americans in International Affairs, TransAfrica Forum 6, 3 and 4
(June 9, 1989), 55.




Department. From 1898 to 1935, African-Americans exerted themselves in other
institutions. One of the institutions in which African-Americans exercised opposition to
the U.S. foreign policy aspirations was the Anti-Imperialist League. According to Mr.
Jim Zwick in African-Americans in the Anti-ImperialistMovement.
African-Americans and their allies within the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) also played significant roles in
the anti-imperialist organizations formed during the 1920s. The NAACP
was deeply concerned about the racial motivations and consequences of
U.S. interventions in Haiti, Santo Domingo and other countries in the
Caribbean and Central America, and was already playing a leading role in
opposing those interventions. Among the leaders of those efforts with the
NAACP who became involved with the Haiti-Santo Domingo Independence
Society, the American Fund for Public Service Committee on American
Imperialism, and the All-American Anti-Imperialist League were James
Weldon Johnson, W.E.B. DuBois, William Pickens, Moorfield Storey,
Oswald Garrison Villard, and Mary White Ovington.
DuBois combined precise scholarship and historical knowledge to become one of the
leading advocates in foreign policy on behalf of Africa. His pronounced interest in Africa
prior to TransAfrica makes him a seminal influence, beginning with the efforts of his
own organization, the Niagara Movement. Between 1905 and 1907, DuBois argued for
the liberation of Africa from imperialist powers. His outspokenness revealed the roles of
Europe and America in the exploitation of Africa, particularly South Africa, and their
concomitant desire for cheap labor and immense profits. DuBois states:
The most dangerous excuse for this situation is the relation between
European capital and colored labor involving high profit, low wages and
cheap material. It places the strong motive of private profit in the
Jim Zwick, “African Americans in the Anti-Imperialist Movement,” TransAfrica Forum 5,1 (Fall 1987), 71.
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foreground of our inter-racial relations, while the greater objects of
cultural understanding and moral uplift are pushed into the background/®
In the years to follow, Dubois became known as the “Father ofPan-Africanism,”
and led the first Pan-African Congress, addressing issues of foreign policy relevant to
both Africa and the Caribbean. To clarify foreign policy attitudes at the first Congress
held on February 19-21, 1919, Dubois’ position can be summarized thusly:
His experiences with this congress were the first in a line of events which
revealed to DuBois what he believed to be the crux of the problems of his time;
the widespread efforts of white Europeans to use the labor and material of the
colored world for its own wealth and power.^®
The Second Pan-African Congress was held in the historic Versailles Palace, in
Paris, France, between August 21 and September 6, 1921. At this conference, DuBois
demanded that the United States and its European allies “establish laws to protect
African’s racial, economic, and political interests, and that these laws are enforced
through the League ofNations.”''® At the same Congress, DuBois specified exactly what
“Pan-Africanists” wanted: that Cameroon and Tanganyika be governed by an
international body as opposed to a defeated Germany or some other colonialist nation. At
the second Pan-African Congress, the press attended as they had not before and published
detailed accounts of the proceedings. The literature suggests that in this meeting, DuBois
recommended an end to colonialism in those countries. Great Britain, France, Portugal,
^®Dr. William E. DuBois, The Niagara Movement Address to the Country, Foreign Affairs, 21,4, (July, 1943),
240.
^®Lerone YkxmeU, Reconstruction to Supreme Court 1954, (Chicago: Johnson Publishing Company 1971), 161.
'’°Ibid., 140.
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Belgium, Italy, Germany, and many other European nations rejected the demands of the
Pan-Africanists.
The Third Pan-African Congress was held on November 7* and 8*'’, 1923, in
London and November 25, 1923 in Lisbon, Portugal. In London, the Foreign Relations
and Circle of Friends, an anti-imperialist interest group, sponsored DuBois as leader and
primary speaker of this Congress. The literature shows that mainly because of his
political activism and impassioned oratory at previous Pan-African Congress proceedings
(DuBois recommended international bodies to govern African countries, as well as an
end to colonialism, which was seen as a direct and controversial challenge to western
countries), the Congress had become an internationally recognized voice for African
freedom and had electrified the audience at Lisbon with its ideas. One former prime
minister, several members of parliament and an assemblage of Ministers of Colonies
were in attendance and expressed their surprise along with their respect for what they had
seen. With W E B. DuBois as an outstanding example (and there are others), the literature
clearly illustrates the foreign policy interests of Africans and African-Americans. It also
indicates that black leadership from colonized countries supported the Pan-African
Congress, demonstrating their support through attendance and full participation.
The Fourth Pan-African Congress was held on August 21®* - 24***, 1927, in New
York City. At this Congress, DuBois and others exposed the often oppressive conditions
in colonial Africa, using fifty-two maps and charts. During those four days, African
history, African missions, a report from the Brussels Conference for Oppressed Races,
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conditions in the Caribbean, African economic development, the partition of Africa,
African literature, and education were examined.
The Pan-African Congresses provided the basis for a League ofNations petition
and a commission to provide further information about conditions in Africa. When the
United Nations was founded, in 1945, the foundation had been laid for the U. N.
trusteeship system. DuBois and the Congresses continued to protest European
colonization and American indifference, arguing for an institution to oversee the
decolonization and what they saw as the inevitable shift to independence in the colonies.
The literature also suggests that they persevered despite the intransigence of European
countries. DuBois’ impact on foreign policy was significant, and he was the first African
American to globalize the problems of African-Americans and connect them to
nationalism in Africa.
In January of 1937, the Council on African Affairs was founded in New York. It
was the very first organization that blacks created for the express purpose of influencing
U.S. policy toward Africa. In its fledgling beginnings, the Council was composed of
twelve members. Some of the members included Dr. Max Yergan, a faculty member of
the City University and the first African-American to attend City. For years, he worked in
the YMCA as an official in the service, operating in Africa. Another member of the
organization was Mordecai Johnson, the chief executive officer ofHoward University. At
that time, Howard University was the leading African-American educational institution.
Perhaps the most controversial member of the twelve-member board was Paul Robeson,
the international concert singer and actor. Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, a professor ofpolitical
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science, was also a board member. The most radical ideas about Africa’s relationship to
American blacks was espoused by an African American scholar and Marxist, William
Alphaeus Hunton. Then, in August of 1943, the controversial Harlem congressman,
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., joined the Council. With Powell in membership, the Council
gained “a high degree of access to American institutions and policymakers.”''' Since its
beginning, the Council focused on South Africa because of the contacts Yergan had
developed over the years, which included the African National Congress (ANC). Jackson
stated:
From the beginning, the Council devoted intense interest to South Africa,
partly because, through Yergan, the Council members acquired extensive
contacts with progressive South Africans, especially with the African
National Congress (ANC), the oldest and biggest nationalist organization
in Black Africa.''^
The Council expanded its role by donating regularly to nationalist causes in Nigeria,
South Africa, and Kenya. By the summer of 1949, the assistance increased, with Dr.
DuBois elevated to the chairman of the new African Aid Committee, which included
hundreds of sponsors of prominent background. In the following year, the Council
demanded the expulsion of South Africa from the U N.
The Council influenced American policy in two ways. First, it consulted and
corresponded with the White House and State Department. Second, the members of the
Council met with the new division of the Division ofAfrican Affairs created in January
‘"Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto to U.S. Foreign Policy TowardAfrica Since 1960 (New York:
William Morrow and Company, 1982), 142.
"^Ibid., 143.
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15, 1944. In this meeting, Hunton and Yergan proposed pro-Africa policies. As a result,
the State Department sent forth for the first time since the latter part of the nineteenth
century, African-American experts to Ethiopia and Liberia. However, the appointments
did not last long because Senator Joseph McCarthy, a powerful right-wing Senator during
the 1950s, tarnished the reputation of the Council. The Council was accused of
association with communist operatives and, by 1955, had been hounded out of existence.
The literature points out that the Council, however, provided a blueprint for the formation
of its sister organization, TransAfrica. Like its predecessor, TransAfrica justified its
existence by expressing a vision for the future, namely, influencing policy on Africa and
Caribbean. Second, TransAfrica corresponded with the White House and State
Department Council. Third, TransAfrica encouraged the Congress to appoint African
Americans to diplomatic positions to propose policies. The Council was a pivotal
influence on TransAfrica and several other organizations as well.
In 1964, Malcolm X revived the foreign policy objectives of the Council with the
creation of the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU)- This organization was
Pan-African in outlook, just as its predecessor had been. The OAAU, led by Malcolm,
attempted to meet with Secretary of State, Dean Rusk and U.N. Ambassador, Adlai
Stevenson, to hold talks on African policy, thus following the precedent set by the
Council in that it sought dialogue with policymakers in both Washington D. C. and the
United Nations. The literature shows that Malcolm and the OAAU realized the
importance of establishing linkages with public officials and also illustrates that the
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political activism of DuBois, Pan-Africanism, and Council on African Affairs were
revived in the OAAU.
To affect foreign policy regarding South Africa, Dr. Martin L. King, Jr. and other
civil rights leaders formed the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa
(ANLCA) in 1962. They appealed to the Johnson Administration to prohibit future
American investments in South Africa, to support a U.N. sponsored oil embargo against
South Africa, and to stand firmly against Apartheid in South Africa. ANLCA went
further in demanding that the US. stop the practice ofexcluding African-Americans from
official missions to South Africa. Johnson was not responsive to these legitimate
concerns. The group also failed to win the right to participate in the mediation process in
the civil war in Nigeria. In short, the organization was not successful in any of its efforts.
In spite of this setback. King’s foreign policy perspective continued to evolve. He
understood the connection between Africans and African-Americans. Furthermore, King
knew that the Vietnam War had a tremendous effect on domestic policy that drained
necessary support for the “War on Poverty” in America. In 1967, at Riverside Church, he
spoke out against the Vietnam War and received a barrage of condemnation from the
media and African-American organizations. The literature shows that King had evolved
to the point that he saw a strong connection between the fate of Africa and American
domestic policy. According to William Minter, “There is considerable evidence that
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King’s political evolution is reflected in the Riverside address—linking domestic racial
oppression, the capitalist class system, and U.S. policies in the Third World.”'*^
According to Gayle Plummer, author of Evolution of the Black Foreign Policy
Constituency, African-Americans developed a new foreign policy constituency to address
the lack of influence in the foreign policy establishment. During this period, African-
American churches, organizations, and the black press defined and influenced the foreign
policy establishment in the mid-twentieth century. Plummer states:
The proliferation of urban organizations occurred as activists perceived
the opportunities inherent in large, concentrated memberships.
Widespread black poverty encouraged philanthropy, and segregated
divisions of such service-oriented organizations as the YMCA grew
rapidly. Church-based societies also devised relief programs. These
organizations were among the first to address international questions and
to suggest that Afro-Americans had foreign policy interests to define.'^
She points out the transition of the foreign policy community and notes that a concerned
audience was not only growing, but the proliferation of organizations had encouraged and
actively solicited the support of new elements in the African-American community.
Plummer continues: “The black foreign policy audience initially sprang from a core of
politicians, clergy, press, intellectuals, and cadres from Christian, social welfare and
peace organizations. It was later joined by conventional civil rights groups and organized
"’^WilliamMinter, KingSolomon'sMines Revisited, Western Interests and the BurdenedHistory ofSouthern
Africa. (Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1984), 136.
'’''Gayle Plummer, “Black Foreign Pohcy Constituency,” TransAfrica Forum, 6, 3 and 4, (Spring-Surtuner
1989), 69.
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labor.”''^ The literature shows that African-Americans did not practice or approve of
isolationism in foreign policy nor did African-Americans simply focus on domestic
policy only, but extended their foreign policy interest beyond domestic borders prior to
TransAfrica. Plummer states:
The efforts to influence action in the United Nations in 1945 were among
the first of several trials. Backed by the National Lawyers Guild, the CIO
Public Workers of America, the National Maritime Union, and a host of
black fraternal and veteran’s associations, the National Negro Congress
drafted a petition to the United Nations in mid-1946.
\n Afro-Americans AndAfrica: The Unbroken Link, Jackson stated:
Black Americans’ interest in Africa clearly did not begin with Andrew
Young’s emergence as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, although
Young did focus national attention on Africa to a degree unknown before
in American history. He performed as a dynamic advocate ofU.S. interest
in Africa during the first two years of the Carter Administration, raising to
priority such policy issues as the independence of Zimbabwe, and taking
provocative positions designed to terminate the traditional policy of U.S.
neglect in favor of a progressive embrace of the diverse African regimes.
He also focused concern on apartheid in South Africa, a longstanding
issue of black opposition. As an American leader, he broke new ground,
but as a black American, he was the latest and most influential
representative of black support of the anti-colonial and developmental
struggles ofAfrican societies."’
The aforementioned work confirms Young’s support ofAfnca’s governments.
"^Ibid., 75.
"®Ibid.
"’Henry Jackson, Afro-Americans andAfrica: The Unbroken Link (New York; WilliamMorrow and Company
1982), 122.
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In sum, African-Americans viewed U S. foreign policy towards Africa as not in
their own best interests and exhibited an enduring interest in foreign affairs dating from
the American Colonization Society of the nineteenth century. African-Americans also
recognized Africa as their ancestral homeland, gave speeches in churches, clubs, and
business associations, supported Republican candidates in the nineteenth and twentieth-
centuries, and pushed for appointments to key positions of influence in government.
In order to understand the contributions of TransAfrica to end apartheid, specific
U S. policy directives regarding South Africa must be examined:
Magdoff divided U.S. foreign policy in South Africa into two components:
(1) A drive to maintain private trade in the world. Subsumed under this are
such considerations as (a) the prevention of competitive empires from
acquiring privileged trading and investments preserves to the disadvantage
of U.S. business interest, and (b) wherever feasible, the attainment of
preferred trading and investment position for U.S. business. (2) And, the
promotion of Counter Revolution. This is composed of several elements.
(a) abortion of incipient revolutions, (b) suppression of social revolutions
in progress, and (c) counter revolution against established socialist
societies through war, economic pressure, or corruption of leaders in the
socialist fold."®
Magdoff recognizes that American policy undergirded Apartheid and with the help of the
CIA, indigenous traitors, and counterinsurgency tactics, prevented any kind of social
upheaval that would upset the status quo. Moreover, Magdoff recognized that the internal
forces in South Africa and external forces of the U.S., Great Britain, and Germany made
it difficult for black South Africans to extricate themselves from the Apartheid system.
"®Harry Magdoff, The Age OfImperialism: The Economics ofU.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1969), 1.
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In fact, according to Peter Schraeder in The UnitedForeign Policy Toward
Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Chcmge, “TransAffica, the foreign policy
lobbying apparatus for African Americans, and the Congressional Black Caucus
are quick to emphasize the importance of the ethnic link.”"® In this part of the
literature, Schraeder stresses the critical point that TransAfrica has repeatedly
focused on the foreign policy establishment’s excessive financial profits. For
example, TransAfrica expressed its disapproval of President Carter’s firing of
United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young. Randall Robinson encouraged
African-Americans to fax and telephone the White House expressing disapproval
ofCarter’s action and African-Americans followed his admonishment. The callers
reminded the President of their support in the 1978 election and that it should not
be taken for granted. They also were disappointed in his lack of support for
Ambassador Young. TransAfrica proved to the U.S. foreign policy establishment
that African-Americans had deep connections to Africa and that Ambassador
Young was a conduit for their concerns. Moreover, it emphasized that African-
Americans felt a strong, spiritual, ancestral tie to the land from which they had
been stolen especially after the consciousness raising era of the 1960s. Schraeder
also points out that TransAfrica was the organization that consistently spoke out
on behalf of African-Americans about policies relevant to Africa. In later years,
the perception of foreign policy in South Africa did not change. On the eve of a
"®Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy TowardAfrica After The EndOfThe Cold War (Chicago:
Loyola University, 1994), 3.
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visit by President George W. Bush, in 2003, there was a certain amount ofdistrust
and skepticism expressed by the African-American and South African
communities. In “As South Africa Awaits Bush, Anti-U.S. Feeling Is In the Air”,
Lydia Polgreen writes that black South Africans still have misgivings about U.S.
foreign policy. She stated, “The way they see American foreign policy developing
concerns South Africans. It is combination ofgunboat diplomacy and checkbook
diplomacy that undermines other kinds of diplomacy.”^ Black South Africans
perceived U.S. foreign policy to be a primary cause of the sustained suffering of
their people during the difficult days of Apartheid. John Stremlau states:
There are long and painful memories of where the U.S. was on the
struggle against apartheid. South Africans have always been skeptical of
American leadership because they have been on the short end of that stick
before. In the 1980’s the United States waffled on imposing penalties on
apartheid South Africa and did so in 1986 only after Congress overrode
President Reagan’s veto.*'
During his visit. President Bush promoted the interests of direct foreign investment in
South Africa. Polgreen realizes that the policy of Apartheid, constructed by the Afrikaner
National Party, in 1948, and applauded in U.S. foreign policy circles, is a reminder that
U.S. policymakers had done little to confront the political and economic challenges in
South Africa. In fact, most black South Africans believe that President Reagan feigned




indecisiveness on the issue of anti-Apartheid measures in order to avoid imposing
sanctions on South Africa and maybe even to avoid another Congressional veto.
The literature review points out the role of TransAfrica in contributing to the
downfall of Apartheid in South Africa and acknowledges the influence that African-
Americans had in the formation of U S. foreign policy toward Africa beginning in the
early period of the eighteenth century. This thesis contributes to existing literature by
showing how TransAfrica utilized people, history, events, organizations, and fortuitous
timing to realize its goals.
CHAPTER m
FILLING IN A GAP DOMESTICALLY
IN THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT
In the United States prior to 1959, there were few African American organizations
that exhibited a sustained interest in foreign policy. Indeed, from 1959-1977, the anti-
Apartheid movement in the U.S. was not a major focus of any African American
organization. Domestic issues were seen as more immediate, and the apparent lack of
interest in international affairs encouraged the Congress, State Department, National
Security Agency, and Executive to assume that African Americans lacked the interest in
or knowledge of a true political solution to the problems in South Africa of
discrimination, deprivation, poverty, violence, and dehumanization. Then in 1977,
during the Black Leadership Conference on South Africa, William Minter wrote in a very
influential essay:
In September 1976 a Black Leadership Conference on South Africa had endorsed
support for southern African liberation movements, backed comprehensive
economic sanctions against South Africa, and decided to found a lobbying
organization, TransAfrica.
In response to this entreaty and to other influences as well, TransAfrica was founded, in
1977, with the purpose of acting as a foreign-policy education advocacy organization
designed to promote a higher level of interest in U.S. foreign policy, especially in the
Caribbean Island and Africa.
^^WilliamMinter, KingSolomon'sMines Revisited, Westerns Interests and the BurdenedHistory ofSouthern
Africa (New York : Basics Books, 1986), 280.
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Over the years, TransAfrica has sought funding from various sources such as
individuals, corporations, and foundations. With the funding TransAfrica received in its
formative years, it lobbied the House of Representatives, the Senate, the White House,
and the State Department. To disseminate information, particularly concerning U S.
foreign policy and how it influences Africa and the Caribbean, Randall Robinson created
the TransAfrica Fonm in 1981. TransAfrica Forum is the communication arm of the
organization and primarily exists to analyze, collect, and circulate information on U S.
foreign policy in Africa and the Caribbean. It publishes two quarterly journals:
TransAfrica News and TransAfrica Forum. In the early days, TransAfrica Forum served
in other capacities as well such as preparing African American students for the Foreign
Services Exam and convening an annual conference on foreign policy. Additionally,
TransAfrica Forum assumed the role of educational affiliate of TransAfrica Lobbying
Forum in Washington D.C. Describing his interview with Randall Robinson in 1986,
Frank McCoy stated:
TransAfrica was founded in 1977, as an African-American response to perceived
inadequacies and insensitiveness on the part of the U.S. foreign policy
establishment. The Board of Directors includes Dr. Dorothy Height, Rev. Wyatt
Tee Walker, William Lucy, Harry Belafonte and as Chairman, Honorable Richard
G. Hatcher, Mayor of Gary, Indiana. Since that time, it has developed a paid
membership of over 10,000; developed a nation-wide support committee; created
TransAfrica Forum, the nation’s only regularly published foreign policy review
and analysis from the Africa American perspective; and has been instrumental in
carrying out a series of demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience at the South
African Embassy in Washington, D C.”
’^Randall Robinson, “Conversation With Randall Robinson,” by Frank McCoy THE CRISIS,(November. 1986)93
9:492,22.
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One of the concerns that TransAffica has had in foreign policy is making sure the
countries of Africa receive the financial aid from the U.S. government that is
commensurate with that given to Asian and European countries that also have become
democratic countries. In 1985, TransAfrica led demonstrations against Apartheid at the
South African Embassy. These demonstrations would eventually lead to the 1986 Anti-
Apartheid Act by the House of Representatives and the Senate, imposing sanctions
against South Africa and overriding the veto of President Reagan. The result of the
sanctions was a political and economic embargo directed at South Africa and contributing
in large part “to the demise of Apartheid.”^"
To protest U.S. policy denying Haitian refugees entrance into the U.S., and to
solidify his role as a foreign policy influence in global African politics, Robinson went on
a hunger strike beginning April 11, 1994 to help restore President Jean-Bertrand Aristide
to his rightful position. The U.S. responded by easing policy restrictions unfavorable to
the immigration of Haitian refugees. To further help restore President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, TransAfrica lobbied Congress. Then, while a military junta illegally ruled
Nigeria, TransAfrica launched a second campaign in 1995 with letters of endorsements
from celebrities, educators, and politicians for a return to democratic principles in that
country. In fact, Robinson pressured the regime with protests, speeches, and
advertisements to bring about negative press against the ruling government. In March of
1995, “TransAfrica accused General Sani Abacha, the military leader who took control of
^Ibid.
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Nigeria’s government, in 1993, following a military coup”” of perpetrating crimes
against the people. During the initial overthrow. General Abacha was responsible for
censoring the press and killing many political opponents. Robinson pleaded with the
military government to restore “democracy to Nigeria’s 100 million people.”” In some
quarters of the African American community, he was criticized for taking such action.
But Robinson contended:
African-Americans ought to care about Africa and the Caribbean because we are
much stronger together than separate. Our potential as blacks is to harness our
power globally. Then our African-American business communities will trade with
those African and Caribbean communities, and we will all be healthier for it.”
TransAfrica was created with the primary purpose ofaffecting Apartheid in South Africa,
but Robinson was aware that a global approach to democratization in Africa was the best
way to focus attention on more specific issues in South Africa and to mobilize general
support at home. To promote a sanctions bill and other efforts that might end Apartheid,
TransAfrica had to interface with Congressional committees, prominent personalities,
and other figures of note or influence regarding all areas of Africa, the Caribbean and
other regions that suffered from economic imperialism. McCoy stated:
TransAfrica’s mission is to make clear to the administration and to the Congress





cause a development of a more sensitive and progressive policy toward Africa and
galvanize black and popular opinion in that direction.^*
One of the first historical analyses of TransAfrica’s role in galvanizing and
mobilizing African-Americans on U S. foreign policy is contained in From The Congo To
Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy TowardAfrica Since 1960. Jackson stated:
With an insider’s knowledge of the America political process, as well as the
interest-group focus of American politics, Robinson began to lobby the House of
Representatives in May 1978, directing his pro-Afiica appeals to legislators
whose congressional districts accounted for a substantial portion of the Black
electorate. Using political contacts and a small team of volunteers, he set out to
have a systematic capacity in each congressional district where we have more
than ten percent of the population to move opinion from the population to the
congressperson, or to the president or to the secretary of state. With roots deep in
the American political system, TransAfrica sought to influence U.S policy toward
Africa from within the system.^^
Jackson presented evidence in the research that interest in foreign policy in the
African American community was growing by the decade. Therefore, TransAfrica
fulfilled a need for an organizational structure that reflected the new awareness. African-
Americans were further educated, in 1977, when Ambassador Andrew Young was forced
to resign from his position at the United Nations. Young’s apparent mistreatment
galvanized African American political constituencies and the rhetorical protest was
spearheaded by Randall Robinson and TransAfrica. Robinson was an outspoken
^Idem.
^enry F. Jackson, From The Congo To Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward j^rica Since JP(50 (New York:
WilliamMorrow and Company, 1982), 123-126.
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opponent of the growing relationship of South Africa and Israel, the key issue over which
Young had been dismissed:
This Black interest group was also distinguished by the size of its constituency.
With a membership of ten thousand in 1979, the successful lobby presented clear
evidence ofBlack Americans’ enduring interest in Africa and their contemporary
opposition to Apartheid. When Young was removed as U. N. Ambassador, for
instance, Robinson took the opportunity to remind President Carter that ‘we have
been all too alone in our protests ofgrowing intimacy between Israel and the state
of South Africa.’ On a signal from Robinson, the lobby’s membership flooded the
White House with letters, telegrams, and telephone calls protesting the
circumstances ofYoung resignation.®®
Utilizing this descriptive case study, Jackson shows how TransAfrica influenced the
worldwide movement against Apartheid. He provides information on TransAfrica’s ties
with the Organization of African Unity. Jackson shows that TransAfrica connected with
the larger movement. He states:
Three years after its formation, TransAfrica had also established itself among
African nations. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) elevated the Black
American lobby to a functional status in its council of ministers, and it received
Robinson as quasiplentipotentiary without portfolio at the 1980 OAU meeting in
Sierra Leone. The TransAfiica leader participated in drafting an OAU declaration
that vilified Western investments in South Africa and the Sullivan Principles (fair
employment guidelines for U.S corporations in South Africa) as detrimental to
South Africa’s Black majority. At the annual TransAfrica fundraising benefit
earlier, Tanzania’s Ambassador to the U.N. Salim A. Salim, who then served as
President of the General Assembly, keynoted the occasion, providing further
witness to TransAfrica’s links to the Africa continent.®'
Jackson stresses some critical points in the work in the field of political science.




Second, he shows that TransAfrica utilized a strategy that targeted Congressional districts
with ten percent or greater African-American voters in order to influence policy
outcomes. Third, Jackson explains that TransAfrica presented African-American opinions
and scholarly support for change to Congressmen, the President, and the Secretary of
State in the early 1980s. Fourth, Jackson shows that TransAfrica expanded its strategies
to influence a worldwide movement against Apartheid.
Another analysis that indicates the growth and influence of TransAfrica is that
William Minter, in an argument presented in King Solomon’s Mines Revisited: Western
Interests and the Burdened History ofSouthern Africa who states that President Carter
changed policy directions because of the founding of TransAfrica. Dr. Minter says;
Several factors inclined the Carter administration to a visibly more pro-African
position. A black American constituency showing increased interest in African
liberation had played a supportive role in Carter’s election. In September 1976 a
Black Leadership Conference on South Africa had endorsed support for southern
African liberation movements, backed comprehensive economic sanctions against
South Africa, and decided to found a lobbying organization, TransAfrica.®
In this work, Minter points out that Black leadership laid the groundwork for changes in
the South Africa policy. Second, Minter illustrates that the leadership realized the
importance of having an international lobbying organization specializing on policies in
“william Minter, KingSolomon'sMines Revisited, Westerns Interests and the BurdenedHistory ofSouthern
Africa (New York: Basics Books, 1986), 280.
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Africa. Third, TransAfrica’s growing influence and overwhelming African-American
support influenced the Carter Administration to take a more proactive stance against
South Afiican policies.
Moreover, this development was particularly profound in Southern Africa because
throughout the history of American diplomacy, few blacks had, with several notable
exceptions, significant, meaningfiil influence on United States policy toward South
Africa. According to James Coleman and Richard Sklar in Africa Crisis Areas and U.S.
Foreign Policy :
The door of American diplomacy rarely opened for Afro-American claims or
claimants before the 1970’s when the newly established congressional Black
Caucus convened successive meetings attended by intellectuals and the
representatives of organized groups, leading to the formation, in 1977, of
TransAfnca, Inc., which would seek to influence American policies toward Africa
and the Caribbean. With the appointment in 1977 of a leading participant in this
process, namely Congressman Andrew Young, Jr. (D-Ga.), as ambassador to the
United Nations, the long-sought Afro-American role in foreign policy, with
particular regard for the concerns of Third World peoples, attained symbolic
recognition.®^
This work illustrates one of the problems with U.S. foreign policy and its general
conduct. First and foremost, the process excluded, when possible, African-Americans,
though they exhibited an increasing political interest in Africa. Second, this study makes
clear that the meetings of the Black Caucus led to the formation of TransAfrica in 1977.
The Black Caucus included some of the strongest, most senior members of the House of
Representatives and was a strong advocate for freedom and justice in black South Africa.
®^Gerald J. Bender, James Coleman, and Richard Sklar, African Crisis Areas And U.S. Foreign Policy, (London:
University ofCalifornia Press, 1985), 18.
47
The literature indicates the formation ofTransAfrica led to activism on Apartheid.
TransAfrica was a strong advocate on behalf of Black South Africans. In Congressional
Initiatives on SouthAfrica, Anne Forrester stated the following:
Non-governmental organizations are often more active on specific African issues
but share the congressional groups’ narrow base of appeal to larger public
constituencies. Groups such as TRANSAFRICA, the Washington Office on
Africa, and the American Committee on Africa over the years have sustained a
strong advocacy concerning Apartheid in South Africa and the regional crisis it
has engendered.®^
Forrester has suggested that non-governmental organizations in the field of political
science have a greater appeal because of the ability to reach out to a wider base of
constituencies. Since TransAfrica is a non-governmental organization, it could have
afforded specific support on those issues relating to Africa. Also, TransAfrica was
founded to highlight United States policy toward Africa and the Caribbean. Congress
had heretofore effectively supported Apartheid and failed to pass a substantial divestment
policy to relieve the dehumanizing effects that black South Africans experienced. As a
non-governmental organization, TransAfrica focused specifically on Apartheid in the
beginning. The literature shows that TransAfrica centered its attention on the plight of
black South Africans which led to historic changes in U S foreign policy in South Africa.
In Sanctions, BlackAmerica, andApartheid: Vindicating the Promise ofPeaceful
Change, Winston P. Nagan stated.
The activities of such NGOs as the American Committee on Africa, Trans-Africa,
the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law, as well as the Congressional
Black Caucus, the National Black Convention, and many more groups were able
®^Ibid., 90.
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to capture the attention of the media and political leaders in Congress. It is hard to
imagine a greater turnaround in the U.S foreign policy than the repudiation of
constructive engagement and the imposition, in its place, of a comprehensive
sanctions program to combat racial domination.®^
This study acknowledged the activities ofNGOs including TransAfrica and demonstrates
that TransAfrica challenged the U.S. foreign policy of constructive engagement.
During its involvement in the anti-Apartheid movement, the role of TransAfrica
and the strategies of its leadership led to the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986. Bernard Magubane stated:
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 must be viewed against the
background of the events sketched above and the escalating pressure within the
United States for stronger action against apartheid from students, churches,
African American leaders, and nation-wide demonstrations spearheaded by
TransAfrica. In Section 4, the Act sets out as its principal purpose a
comprehensive and complete framework to guide the efforts of United States in
helping to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa and lead to the establishment
of a non-racial democratic government.®®
Magubane’s work in the field of political science suggests that TransAfrica’s
leadership was pivotal in the passage of this act. The researcher argues that TransAfrica
was successful in organizing NGOs in nation-wide demonstrations, another specific and
influential strategy. These demonstrations were a catalyst for implementation of the act
and researchers further contend that TransAfrica leadership significantly assisted the
global struggle to dismantle Apartheid in South Africa through its direct action strategies.
“^Charles P. Henry, Foreign Policy And The International Interest (Albany: State University ofNew York Press,
2000), 124.
®®Bemard Magubane, “Reagan and South Afnca,” TransAfrica Forum 6, 3 and 4 (Spring-Summer 1989), 48.
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In 1996, Donald Culverson contends in The Politics ofAnti-ApartheidMovement
in the UnitedStates:
Perhaps the most significant organizational development in the anti-apartheid
movement during this period was the formation of TransAfrica in 1977. It was a
product of increased black American interest in foreign affairs. TransAfrica
became the most and consistent critic of Apartheid.®’
In “Black Think Tank Opens A Foreign Institute” written in 1993, Karen DeWitt
stated, “TransAfrica, a lobbying group of Black Americans on African and Caribbean
issues, was the driving force behind the campaign for United States economic sanctions
against South Africa’s move toward abolishing apartheid.”®* She claims that TransAfrica
worked diligently in lobbying members ofCongress to pass sanctions to give black South
Africans relief from Apartheid. DeWitt recognizes TransAfrica’s role in convincing
Congress to pass economic sanctions, the campaign waged against Apartheid
prior to complete dismantling, and TransAfrica leadership in the anti-Apartheid
movement in the United States. DeWitt’s article in the New York Times means that
TransAfrica is recognized in a main stream media outlet. Also, as a main-stream writer
on TransAfrica, she reveals that TransAfrica was the force behind the anti-Apartheid
movement of the 1980s.
^’Donald R. Culverson, “The Politics ofAnt-apartheid Movement in the United States,” Political Science
Quarterly VIINI, (Spring 19%), 127-149.
“Karen DeWitt, “Black Think Tank Opens A Foreign Institute,” The New York Times, 6 June 1993,13-16.
“ibid.
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TransAfrica utilized the media as part of the strategy to dismantle Apartheid in
South Africa. The literature shows that daily demonstrations at the South Africa Embassy
enticed the media to research and publicize adverse conditions in South Africa. David
Dickson asserts that TransAfrica’s “Capital lobbying activities and sponsorships of
media-covered demonstrations outside of South Africa’s Washington embassy played an
instrumental role in the 1986 congressional passage of South African sanctions.”’®
Dickson asserts that 1985 and 1986 were the most dramatic years for TransAfrica
because of the media coverage of the demonstrations at the South African Embassy. By
focusing on the South African Embassy, TransAfrica made it a symbol of oppression.
The American public, in general, began to view the Embassy as a focal point for protest
in America and a promoter of anti-democratic ideals. Also, the media was increasingly
present to record the activity that took place at the Embassy and the visual images were
broadcast into American living rooms each day. According to Dickson, TransAfrica used
civil disobedience; a strategy borrowed from the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s to
gain attention to the mistreatment ofblack South Africans. TransAfrica was able to
galvanize and organize the public around the issue of Apartheid. One problem in the
beginning was “a small staff and a limited budget.”” But TransAfrica nevertheless
became more and more influential in the anti-Apartheid movement. Indeed, Dickson cites
one variable (limited budget) to point out that TransAfrica achievements were




leadership constructs, agenda strategies, and increased membership numbers to conclude
that TransAfrica was very resourceful, despite a meager staff and budget. However, the
first variable Dickson researched was constituency mobilization:
TransAfrica was largely created by mainstream African-American leaders.
TransAfrica’s status as a chief voice of these leaders and their constituents was
given credibility at a March 1980 convention of African-American leaders who
requested that it prepared a foreign policy agenda for the 1980s. TransAfrica
reaches out to African Americans through regionally based meetings and through
the encouragement of more than a dozen chapters. By the late 1980s, it claimed
almost 10,000 African American members in TransAfrica. TransAfrica Lobbying
Firm made the public aware of the plight of the black South Africans who toiled
under the hardship and despair ofApartheid.’^
Dickson demonstrates that TransAfrica was founded as a public voice for African-
Americans concerned about U S. foreign policy, particularly towards Africa and shows
that TransAfnca used the American political system to achieve its stated goals.
TransAfrica also utilized the media to expose the general public to the hardships that
black South Africans experienced. Many Americans were unfamiliar with the system of
ID passes that had to be shown to any white citizen on demand; the brutalization and
imprisonment of children ten and under; the segregation ofjobs that favored English and
Boers; the slums and townships that reeked of untreated sewage; the rape of sometimes
very young black women that produced a substantial mulatto population; and the lack of
citizenship rights such as voting and participation on juries. These are the critical areas
in the study that Dickson produced and that TransAfrica sought to bring to public
attention.
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More importantly, during 1977-1986, the literature reveals that TransAfrica
orchestrated a “series of symbolic arrests ofwell-known figures.”’^ Steven Metz attempts
to show in “The Anti-Apartheid Movement and Formulation Of American Policy Toward
South Africa, 1969-1981,” that TransAfrica promoted symbolic activities to help increase
attention to the movement. TransAfrica was a sponsor of the Free South Africa
Movement that encouraged public figures to become symbols. Steven Metz, stated:
“TransAfrica began a series of highly publicized demonstrations and arrests outside the
South African Embassy in Washington.”^'’ These protests raised public consciousness
about the seriousness of Apartheid and the unjust treatment of the majority of South
African citizens.
In addition, TransAfrica convinced influential public officials of the moral
imperative of the U S. to actively oppose violation of human rights in South Africa. The
importance of the issue of human rights was highlighted by the fact that the public
officials involved included Ronald Dellums ofCalifornia, Gus Savage of Illinois, Major
Owens and Robert Garcia ofNew York, Douglas Kennedy (Robert Kennedy’s youngest
son). Senator Lxiwell Weicker of Connecticut, and Representative William Clay of
Missouri. According to the literature, these well-publicized arrests of prominent people
focused attention on the problems ofSouth Africa.
^^Steven Metz, “The Anti-Apartheid Movement and The Formulation OfAmerican Pohcy Toward South Africa,
1969-1981” ( Ph D. diss., John Hopkins University, 1986), 491.
’'’ibid.
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Steven Metz reveals in “The Anti-Apartheid Movement and The Formulation Of
American Policy Toward South Africa, 1969 -1981” that TransAfrica was able to forge
other coalitions and give energy that appeared to be lost after the election of Ronald
Reagan. Metz examines TransAfrica and indicates that the organization formed other
coalitions, pumped energy into the anti-Apartheid movement, persuaded people of the
moral imperative of the movement, convinced prominent people to force arrest for
symbolic reasons, and created awareness of the mistreatment of black South Africans in
the minds of people in the U.S.
Richard Cohen states in, “The South Africa Protests: Symbol vs. Reality” that
TransAfrica was like “a revival of the old civil rights movement—^both its energy and its
purpose.”” In addition, the literature review indicates that TransAfrica was gradually
recognized by influential foreign policy elites, the “movers and shakers.” Beginning in
December 1984, TransAfrica’s comments and opinions received more and more attention
from the mainstream media. Meanwhile, TransAfrica became the voice for politically
attentive African-Americans on policies in Africa and the Caribbean, but
particularly. South Africa. Over the years, TransAfrica grew in size and influence
concerning policies and attitudes toward Apartheid and was consulted by the executive
officials and Congressional members about issues that affected Africa and the Caribbean.
In the article, “The South AfHca Protests: Symbol vs. Reality,” Cohen confirms that the
foreign policy establishment of the White House, Congress, and State Department began
to respect and depend upon TransAfrica for the clearest and most definite policy
’^chard Cohen, “The South Africa Protests: Symbol vs. Reality,” Washington Post, 5 December 1984,21(A).
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interpretations regarding South Africa. By now, African-Americans also believed
TransAfrica to be their political voice and media outlets vied for TransAfrica’s opinions
and comments on policy issues, especially Apartheid.
In fact, other writings on TransAfrica, including that ofEllen Dorsey in “Human
Rights strategy for a changing international environment: The United States Anti-
Apartheid Movement in transition” posits that:
Throughout the early 1980’s, TransAfrica grew in size and influence increasingly
recognized by the foreign policy decisional elite as the voice of politically
informed African Americans on foreign policy issues, statements by Robinson
and actions taken by the organization acquired significant media attention. They
were monitored by Congressional and executive officials concerned with African
and Caribbean foreign policy issues.’®
During the anti-Apartheid movement, Dorsey emphasizes that TransAfrica was able to
influence the decisions of Congress. TransAfrica and its representatives spoke with
conviction and compassion and Dorsey reveals in a comprehensive dissertation that
TransAfrica legitimized itself by acting as the formal mediator among anti-Apartheid
advocates, anti-Apartheid organizations and the Congressional Black Caucus. A review
of the literature shows that TransAfrica’s position in the anti-Apartheid movement was as
the dominant representative of the movement and interpreted as such by the decision¬
makers in foreign policy. According to Dorsey:
It was TransAfrica, above any other Anti-Apartheid organization that garnered
and influence over Congressional decisions. The legitimacy that it had as the
authoritative voice of the African American constituency brought TransAfrica
into a mediation role between other national Ant-Apartheid organizations.
’®Ellen Dorsey, “Human Rights Strategy for a Changing International Environment: The United States Anti-
Apartheid Movement in Transition” (Ph.D., diss.. University of Pittsburgh, 1992), 168.
55
Congressional Black Caucus, Anti-Apartheid advocates in the House and Senate,
and the larger legislative body. Increasingly, the positions advocated by
TransAfrica were interpreted in the foreign policy decision-making circles as
representative of the interests, prescriptions, and strategies of the larger Anti-
Apartheid Movement.”
The literature points to Robinson and his extraordinary leadership abilities as the
guiding force in the anti-Apartheid community. Dorsey was able to show that Robinson’s
political acumen, personal charisma, and intellect were attributes that allowed him
quickly and adeptly to work with Representatives Gray and Dellums. Dorsey shows how
in a short time, Robinson gained the respect of members in the House and Senate
Subcommittees on African Affairs, and of the State Department as well. Dorsey states
that “the power of the organization in shaping and guiding the Anti-Apartheid policy
community was greatly enhanced by Robinson’s personal charisma, intellect, and
political acumen.”^® TransAfrica had come to be viewed as representative of the anti-
Apartheid movement and its principles by many foreign policy bodies. Robinson’s
political acumen served the interest of movement and organization, and his strategies
influenced the anti-Apartheid Movement in a decisive way.
Under the leadership of Robinson, the TransAfrica Lobbying Firm began to be
viewed as a viable and influential black institution. In 1986, at a celebration marking the
tenth anniversary of TransAfrica, Congressman William Gray stated in the article,
“Energizing America’s Africa, and Caribbean Policy:”
”lbid.,169.
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TransAfrica has made a name for itself on Capitol Hill and across the country on
matters pertaining to Africa and the Caribbean. Through the bold leadership of
Randall Robinson, through the extraordinary commitment of the TransAfrica
staff, and with the steadfast support of all you, TransAfrica has made the
transition from black organization to black institution.^®
At that time. Congressman Gray recognized that TransAfrica was not just an African-
American organization concerned with civil rights, but a significant force in foreign
affairs. Gray points out that TransAfrica had lasted for over ten years because of its
determination to prove to people that African-Americans have a vested interest in foreign
affairs. In, “Energizing America’s Africa, and Caribbean Policy,” Gray emphasized that
TransAfrica went against all of the odds with a limited staff, budget, and money to make
a difference in foreign policy. He went on to say that the impact of this black institution
was a testament of commitment and hard work. Gray stated that:
Who would have believed ten years ago, that tonight we would be here together,
celebrating a decade ofTransAfrica’s survival and commitment? It has been a
decade in which we have successfully challenged the notion that American blacks
had no interest in-and no legitimate claim upon-the nation’s policy.”*®
Gray continues, “Yes, we can claim victories, such as the enactment of the sanctions bill
last year. And, yes we have raised the consciousness of the nation to the horrors of
Apartheid, and the complicity of our foreign policy in its continuation.”*' During the
celebration. Gray lauds the significant role of this black institution that pressed Congress





and made sure that there would be enough votes to override a President Reagan veto in
the future. On October 2, 1986, Congress responded with the passing of the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, H R. 4868, Public Law 99-440 which was
written as “an act to prohibit loans to, other investments in, and certain other activities
with respect to South Africa, and other purposes.”*^ Gray added:
It is appropriate to celebrate our success-to toast the grit, the chutzpah, the
tenacity of TransAfrica’s staff and supporters, who ignored the ridicule, hostility
and indifference of the establishment and made this organization a significant
force in American foreign policy.”*^
Gray, though not without political bias, was able to view TransAfrica as a force
for just treatment ofthe oppressed.
In fact, in the article, “South Africa’s Next Challenge”, the reporter points out the
importance of TransAfrica during this period of 1977-1992. Back in 1994, TransAfrica
was thought ofby USA TODAY as the leading proponent of the anti-Apartheid movement
in the United States. Robinson’s opinion on the conditions of South Africa was sought
because of the leadership in the organization during the Free South Africa Movement.
USA TODAY goes on to say “Robinson is regarded as the leader of U S. anti-Apartheid
movement.”*'* Moreover, from a critical point of view, Nishimura realized that Robinson
brought valuable leadership to the Anti-Apartheid Movement, dispensed information on
*^Congress, House, Anti-ApartheidActAmendments of1988 toProhibit Investment Certain Other Activities with
Respect to. South Africafor Other Purposes, 100* Cong., 2 sess., H.R. 4868, U. S. G.P.O. Public Law 99-440 (14 October
1988) :H.R.1580.
*^illiam H. Gray, “Energizing America’s AMca, Caribbean Policy,” rraw54/nco Forum, 5, 1 (Fall 1987), 71-
*'Gleim Nishimura, “South Africa’s Next Challenge,” USA TODAY, 21 April 1994,183.
79.
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the status of black South Africans under the Apartheid government of South Africa, and
leads by example during the movement.
TransAfrica affected many policies and practices towards South Africa, and the
media realized that TransAfrica had sought to confront the policies that maintained
Apartheid in the interests of corporations, which prevented social revolutions in South
Africa. TransAfrica would become a significant force in foreign affairs in the years to
come and receive the recognition that it truly deserved. This analysis also asserts that
TransAfrica was instrumental in bringing about the changes in South Africa that
dismembered Apartheid in the country. As a case in point, Robinson argues in current
writings that the American public did not know or care about the people or leadership of
the African National Congress. As the Executive Director ofTransAfrica, he points out
that “Fifteen years ago, when Americans knew or cared little about Apartheid or even
you, Mr. Mandela, the people at this table made South Africa a major issue in America.*'
Defending The SpiritA Black Life in America, points out that the role ofTransAfrica
illuminated the degrading and often terror-filled experiences of black South Africans and
the sacrifices and near martyrdom ofNelson Mandela in the public conscience.
Furthermore, Jesse Jackson increased the moral public consciousness about South
Africa during his election bid of 1984 and involved Robinson in his campaign. With such
support, the TransAfrica Lobbying Firm continued to present issues germane to the
struggle for freedom. Mary Benson writes that;
*'Randall Robinson, Defending The SpiritA BlackLife in America, (New York: Penguin Group, 1998), 183.
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Jesse Jackson’s campaign during the Presidential elections had helped to put
South Africa on the map of public consciousness, while in Congress the Black
Caucus and liberal members had worked steadily, with important assistance from
Randall Robinson’s Trans-Africa organization.*®
According to Phil McCombs, TransAfrica, under the leadership of Robinson, kept the
pressure on the South African government to make changes in the country. He says that
Robinson “led decade-long political assault, against the old regime in South Africa.”*’
Also, in the New York Times article, “Facing Up to the Mugabe Problem,”
Rachel L. Swarns notes that TransAfrica was relentless in putting pressure on the U S.
government. She states:
After all for decades, TransAfrica, a research and lobbying group based here, has
been speaking out on the struggles of Africans on the continent and elsewhere. In
the 1980’s for instance, it led the Anti-Apartheid marches that helped press the
American government to change its policy of constructive engagement with the
white government of South Africa.**
Swarns recognizes in the article that TransAfrica was committed to the struggle for black
South African freedom. TransAfrica did not succumb, but was persistent. From what the
writer concluded, TransAfrica was outspoken on issues relating to Africa and the world,
provided leadership for the anti-Apartheid movement, and pushed the government to
move its policy of constructive engagement into another direction. TransAfrica had to
*®Mary Benson, Nelson Mandela TheMan and theMovement (N&w York'. W.W. Norton & Company, 1986),
201.
*^Phil McCombs, “TransAfrica, Forging Ahead With A Dream” The Washington Post, 2 June 1995, sec. D1.
**Rachel L. Swarns, “Facing Up to the Mugabe Problem,” New York Times, 5 August 2003, sec. A7.
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confront the policies that maintained Apartheid directly through boycotts,
demonstrations, and divestment.
Reviewing The Negative Impact ofApartheid on black South Africans
From a historical perspective, the impact of European domination over black
South Africans had been disastrous. Since the Dutch East Indian Company arrived over
300 years ago, segregation of the races had become the norm. During the nineteenth
century, black South Africans faced discrimination that was “codified” and policies
designed to advance a white ruling minority. These policies supported the economic,
political and social privileges of minority (white) citizens at the expense of black South
Africans. With the rise of the ultra-conservative, rabidly racist Afrikaner National Party
in 1948, the laws against blacks were strengthened and reinforced by the creation of a
virtual police state. In that same year, the party began implementation of the apartheid
system. Dr. Hendrik F. Verwoerd became the architect of the Apartheid system.
Verwoerd worked to enact specific laws aimed at separating the races. This ideology was
linked to a notion of white domination founded on a belief in white biological and
cultural superiority. For the duration ofNationalist rule, from 1948 to 1993, black South
Africans faced political oppression designed to maintain this status. Political oppression
is defined as;
The creation of material, legal, military, economic, and, or social barriers to the
fulfillment of self-determination, distributive justice, and democratic
participation, results by dominating agents to advance their own interests at the
expense of persons or groups in positions of relative powerlessness.
®*Isaac Prilletnsky and Levi Gonick, “Political Change Oppression Remains: On the Psychology and Politics of
Oppression, ’’(Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University, 1994),5.
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One of the ways in which this political oppression was applied concerns the issue of land
allocation. Separate property for blacks and whites along with separate cultural
development were essential to carrying out this policy. Apartheid policies focused on
black homelands reserved for black South Africans and the government enforced a
homelands development policy promoting the creation of “Bantustans.” These
homelands could be described as rural territories, poor, and noncontiguous. Under
Apartheid, black South Africans had to live on less than ten percent of the land although
they made up more than seventy percent of the population. In accordance with
government policy, black South Africans were assigned to homelands based on ethno-
linguistic indicators created by the government. According to the Apartheid theory, the
purpose of government was to create a white nation, to undermine the power of a black
majority and indeed to deny black rights, isolate and terrorize objectors, and present
South Africa as a monolithic, prosperous white nation. In the myopic Apartheid ideal, the
other purpose was that each homeland would eventually become independent, thereby
relieving South Africa of responsibility for its black majority. The purpose of the laws
regarding land distribution was to rationalize white superiority and to expropriate
mineral, oil, and diamond-rich black land. In essence, white South Africa would not have
an obligation to maintain these homelands. The Apartheid government devised the
system of job classification to reserve the best positions for whites, designated middle-
level positions for Coloureds (mulattos, Indians, and Asians), and finally, unskilled
positions were left for black South Africans.
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Another goal of the Nationalist Party was to deny all rights of citizenship of the
black majority, including the right to vote and representation in the national legislative
body. The Bantustans or “homelands” such as Venda, Ciskei, Transkei, and
Boputatswana were pseudo-nations that were never internationally recognized. Of the
nine million blacks designated as citizens, none were listed in the South African Census
in 1989, although they resided outside of the homelands, as Ramsey confirms.
For white South Afi-icans, the doctrine ofwhite supremacy and the extraordinary
privileges of citizenship along with a plentiful supply of cheap labor made life very
comfortable. On the other hand, black South Africans suffered enormously. The 1970s
saw 3.5 million black South Africans relocated forcibly from areas considered “black
spots.” The argument for uprooting them was that they were encroaching on white areas.
At some point in their lives, many blacks were victims of the pass laws. According to F.
Jeffress Ramsay, “Within the townships and squatter camps that ringed the white cities,
families survived from day to day not knowing when the police might burst into their
homes to discover that their passbooks were not in order.^ Black South Afi'icans were
discriminated against in all areas of life. For example, residential status was just as
important as skin color. Blacks who established their right to legally reside in a township
like Soweto were considered privileged because they could seek work in nearby white
urban centers, unlike their coworkers, who lived fiirther away in peri-urban areas. In
many cases, black South Afiicans spent a vast amount of time on buses commuting to
their places of employment. These places of employment, which were often overcrowded
®®Dr. F. Jeffress, Global Studies, (GuilfordiEhiskiii/McGraw, 1997), p.l62.
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with a supply of cheap labor, provided low paying jobs that workers could not afford to
refuse. Even more distressing was that male workers were confined to hostels for months
at a time far removed from their families who lived in the rural homelands. Female
workers had limited opportunities also, typically occupying positions as domestic
servants and living away from their children in the servants’ quarters of white
households. More importantly, black South Afi-ican women earned very little. Despite the
end of Apartheid, millions of black females still earn next to nothing as domestic
servants.
Furthermore, those blacks without employment and housing were often designated
illegal squatters and were victims of night-time police raids. After being rounded up, they
were transported back to their assigned homelands. In some instances, regulations were
relaxed, but the lives of black South Africans remained economically and politically
insecure. Ramsay says, “In 1970 alone, some 3.5 million blacks were forcibly relocated
because they were living in “black spots” within white areas.”^'
Although the Apartheid government often violently destroyed squatter
settlements, it was unable to stem the explosive growth of these makeshift homes. Black
South Africans preferred to live in cardboard boxes without permanent employment as
opposed to facing the extraordinary hardships in the homelands. There, the
unemployment rates often topped 80 percent. Agricultural production was limited or
marginal because of overpopulation. As a result, life in the homelands was miserable,
with hunger, disease, and high crime rates. A steadily growing birth rate further stressed
^‘Ibid.
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limited resources. As JefFress points out, “Life in the homelands has become more
desperate as their populations have mushroomed.”^
The impact of Apartheid on education was just as significant. The Apartheid
government devised a black educational curriculum designed to assure nderachievement,
by preparing black South Africans for only semiskilled and unskilled occupations. Bantu
Education was institutionalized through a series of laws Students who were affected by
such laws were forced to attend schools divided along lines of ethnicity and language.
Jeffress stated, “A student who was classified as Zulu was taught in the Zulu language to
be loyal to the Zulu nation, while his or her playmates might be receiving similar
instructions in Tsonga or Sotho.”” However, the language of business, politics and the
legal system was either English or Afrikaans.
Furthermore, many black South Africans were forced to accept dangerous, low-
skilled positions in the mining industry. The gold-mining industry made millions for the
ruling classes but used primitive, dangerous methods that did not ensure the safety of
black workers. This form of exploitation created some of the worst poverty in the so-
called developed world. Magubane says:
The South African gold-mining industry institutionalized its inhuman structures by
shifting the burden of exploitation onto the backs of powerless Africans. Its
rationality is based neither on the maximum utilization of resources nor on the
advocacy of progress, but on the maximization of profit. The historical specificity of
the gold-mining industry was the frustration of the economic factor by the political
factor, but the creation by the latter of social relations ofproduction that would ensure




settler state introduced policies which integrated all sections of the population into a
single national economy, but did not unify these nationalities into a homogenous
working class.®''
In some cases, black South Africans experienced a form of slavery in the mines. As
Marx explained in Capital:
Wherever a nation whose production is carried on in the more rudimentary forms
of slavery or serfdom lives in the midst of a universal market dominated by
capitalist production, and where therefore the role of its chief purpose-there to the
barbarous infamies of slavery or serfdom are super-added the civilized infamies
of overworking.
Moreover, to share profits from the South African mining industry, the U.S.
established a policy to extend their hegemony in South Africa called “constructive
engagement.” This policy has come to be associated with the Reagan Administration;
however, in truth, it had been in place since the 1960s. Reagan’s constructive engagement
policy had two aims. (1) Support for pro-Western insurgents against those regimes
receiving Soviet assistance and (2) Support for the white minority in South Africa, who
feared the sporadic and often bloody uprisings by black South Africans. The actual
interpretation of the constructive engagement policy was most often articulated by
Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, who wrote extensively on the subject.
Crocker stated in an article entitled “U.S. Policy for the 1980s:”
By 1975 American interest was rudely reawakened. The Portuguese imperial
buffer protecting Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Namibia (Southwest Africa), and South
Africa was suddenly stripped away in 1974-1975. The Western nations appeared
to be ill prepared and impotent to deal with decisive Soviet-Cuban military
intervention that created the Marxist MPLA government of Angola. The
^'’Bernard Magubane, The PoliticalEconomy ofRace and Class in South Africa, (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1979),117.
®^rederick Engels, On Capital, (New York: International P^iblishers, 1934), 27.
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previously low Rhodesian bush war expanded rapidly as the white authorities lost
control of their Mozambique border. Militant rhetoric and communist army were
in increasingly plentiful supply. The 1976 Soweto riots in South Africa seemed to
echo developments further north, sending a shock wave through South Africa and
the capitals of the West. This gloomy prospect caused Washington to shift gears.
President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger started to back
away from the Nixon straddle of the early 1970s, a move which required a more
active diplomacy with African nations, stronger verbal pressure for change in
white-ruled areas, and American involvement in the search for accommodations
in Rhodesia and Namibia. Washington could no longer simply enjoy its varied
interests in Southern Africa; it would have to work actively to pre-empt Soviet-
backed revolutionary change and deter further communist adventurism in the
mineral-rich region stretching from Zaire-Shaba province to Cape Town.®®
According to Crocker, constructive engagement was not intended to lend any assistance
to black South Africans suffering from oppression and exploitation of the white minority
regime. The constructive engagement policy had strict aims as enumerated before. This
policy meant that the U.S. would have to openly embrace the racist regime in the name of
U.S. interests. Crocker suggested that policy makers wanted to align themselves with the
white minority government and by doing so, benignly encourage the country to choose
the path of reform. When Crocker testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, he laid out the key elements of policy that he would pursue as Assistant
Secretary of State ofAfrican Affairs:
The policy would among other things support regional security; ensure for the
U.S. and our allies fair commercial access to essential petroleum and non-fuel
minerals; prompt U.S. trade and investment in Africa; foster basic human liberties
in keeping with both our principles and our long-term interests and objectives;
and cooperate with our Western allies and friends in Africa to deter aggression
and subversion by our adversaries.®’
®®Dr. Chester Crocker, Mario Grezuts, and Robert Henderson, “A U.S. Policy for the 80s,”Africa Report, 26,1,
(January-February, 1981), 7.
®^BemardMagubane, “Reagan and SouthAfrica” TransAfiica Forum, 6, 3 and 4, (Spring and Summer 1989), 42.
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In addition, Crocker emphasized that the goal of the policy was to retain influence
politically, economically, and strategically in South Ajfrica and to continue access to vital
petroleum and non-fiiel minerals, promote trade and investment in Africa by the U.S.,
encourage cooperation with Western allies, and support principles of basic human
liberties. Crocker was clear that the policy of constructive engagement would be “built
around the interests of the South Africa government .”®* Encapsulated in this policy was
the military doctrine of “coercive diplomacy” At Cuito Cuanavale, the forces of South
Africa were humiliated, in 1981, by combined forces from South West Africa People
Organization, Angola, and Cuba. In response, South Africa and its allies made military
incursions into Angola and Mozambique, with deleterious effects on their economies.
During this initiative, the U. S tacitly supported South African policies during the Reagan
Administration, and South Africa was given implied permission to destabilize the region.
Dr. Mugubane stated, “The frontline states were also subjected to sustained sabotage by
South Africa’s agents.”®® Regular incursions into Southern Africa were well-planned,
purposeful and supported by the United States. Carlyle Murphy stated;
Instead of rebuking South Africa for violating the territorial integrity of Angola,
the U.S. vetoed a U. N. resolution condemning the invasion, and in a major
speech on Africa, Chester Crocker gave notice that the U.S. shared several of





In the end, the constructive engagement policy would fail, and the Reagan administration
would be forced to alter its approach. The author of the failed constructive engagement
policy, Chester Crocker, continued his work in diplomatic relations, his first task being to
seek the withdrawal of South African forces from the country of Angola, thereby
hastening the independence of that country.
In that year, February 1988, Crocker visited Luanda, during which time he
attempted to mediate the conflict between South Africa and Angola. The forces of South
Africa launched a final assault on Cuito Cuanavale in Angola for control of the Calutque
Dam. The assault resulted in the death of twelve white South African soldiers in battle
with a joint force of Angolans and Cubans. The combined forces had moved their
artillery within range of the Namibian border delivering a fatal blow to South Africa’s
hope of retaining control of that territory. Within the Afrikaner establishment, there was
dissent. The Dutch Reformed Church publicly criticized President Botha’s conduct of the
war. Magubane stated, “In the first sign of dissent within the Afrikaner establishment
over Pretoria’s war in Angola, main Afrikaner churches publicly questioned Botha’s
conduct.As the pressures continued. South Africa began to consider negotiations and
compromise with Angola.
Perhaps, the South African government recognized that the black South African
resistance movements of AZAPO, Pan Africanist Congress, UDF, and COSAS along
with the ANC were forces to be reckoned with. These entities promoted international
involvement in the internal problems of South Africa. As yet, the alliance between black
'°'Bemard Magubane, “Reagan and South Africa,” TransAfrica Forum 6, 3,and 4 (Spring-Sununer 1989), 49.
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South Africa and African-Americans was little known in America. According to David
McKean, they “serve[d] to generate international publicity, consolidate black opinion and
train future leaders.’”*^
The resistance movements found so much success with the implementation of the
“Defiance Campaign”'^ that South Africa became ungovernable. They fostered economic
boycotts, township protests, general strikes, guerrilla attacks, and public school boycotts
as some of the disruptive strategies, while at the same time, attracting more and more
members to an ever-growing black resistance movement. This latter development was
paramount because the movement used overwhelming numbers of committed fighters to
dislodge the Apartheid laws. McKean confirms:
The role of leaders was no longer seen as one of communicating to whites but
rather as attracting and guiding a growing mass following. Timid attitudes
towards mass action were gone, and in their place had grown a determination to
use the power of African numbers—in strikes and other demonstrations of
strength—^to wring changes out ofwhite South Africa.’®^
Black South Africans definitely contributed to the end of Apartheid in South Africa. The
rebellious elements of the movement realized that actions as described above would make
South Africa ungovernable and bring unprecedented media exposure. Now, the Apartheid
regime found itself with no choice but to negotiate with its opponents.




Implementation of sanctions was one approach in the transition to peace. Such a
strategy was not compatible with the goals of established companies in the United States
(such as Ford and General Motors), which had no intention ofpulling out of South Africa
or suffering from the loss of profits that sanctions would cause. During the sixties, these
corporations made enormous profits and as a result, investment in the South African
economy was very attractive to these and many other business interests. William Minter
states:
Direct investment also bolstered the economy. Long-established firms like
General Motors and Ford made no moves to withdraw. Companies new to South
Africa, like Dow Chemical Kaiser Aluminum, and Firestone, made decisions to
start up operations. In 1962 U.S. companies earned $72 million in profits in South
Africa, at a rate twice their worldwide average. United States direct investment
increased to $23 million in 1961 and $44 million the following year.'°^
The argument for economic disengagement was not well received by the U.S.
government which refused to interfere in what it considered South Africa’s internal
affairs. The anti-Apartheid movement, which pushed in several political forums for
immediate sanctions, was ignored by the State Department, which gave carefully worded
reasons for not taking action against South Africa.
It was during those years, from 1959 to 1986, that the State Department began a
public relations campaign to improve the image of the U.S. government in its foreign
policy towards South Africa. Those policymakers in the State Department did not
'“William Minter, KingSolomon’sMines Revisited, Western Interests and the BurdenedHistory ofSouthern
Africa (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 190.
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sponsor, endorse, nor deliberate on sanctions legislation directed at South Africa. Minter
says:
Those within these branches of the State Department sought measures to improve
the U.S. image. But they operated within the constraint that sanctions, as
demanded by the United Nations majority, were ruled out. Much of their energy,
therefore, went into finding a succession of excuses for inaction.'®®
The idea of instituting sanctions was opposed by Congress, the White House, and
of course, multinational corporations. The impediments created by these roadblocks were
considered necessary because South Afnca was pro-western and anti-Communist and
during that period of the Cold War, such factors were a strong determinant of American
policy. The U.S believed that South Afnca would respond to reasoned arguments against
mistreatment of its indigenous citizens and/or that a vague kind of gradualist strategy
would, in time, change conditions. Also, that black South Africans possessed little or no
political or military influence at home or abroad was a factor in U.S. government
decisions about issues of South African policy. Another viewpoint expressed by many in
positions of power was that few other African nations took a stand against Apartheid, so
why should the U.S.? As well, the liberation of black South Africans might pose some
internal threat to the economic stability of the country. Guerrilla/resistance forces were
not yet the threat they would become, but U.S. intelligence agencies were aware of their
growing and possibly destabilizing influence. For these reasons, sanctions would have to
wait in those years from 1959-1986. Minter explains:
'“®Ibid., 191.
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Such an argument for sanctions depended on the existence of a credible African
military threat. Neither the independent African states nor guerrillas in South
Africa were able to mobilize such a threat. Indeed, most Western liberals
discouraged them from trying, arguing instead for patience. The South African
state, meanwhile, successfully organized the violent repression both of peaceful
protest and of beginning of sabotage. Had the repression been less successfiil,
further loss of confidence in the West might have produced greater willingness to
consider moves in the direction of sanctions. As it happened, the next major
step—a mandatory arms embargo at the United Nations—was not to come until
1977, after the fall of Portugal’s empire and a resurgence of internal protest
seemed again to threaten Pretoria’s stability.
It was clear that the U.S. did not push for sanctions for three primary reasons.
First, the U.S. supported the role of Pretoria in maintaining Apartheid in South Africa as
long as government policies could hinder the expansion ofcommunism in Southern
Africa and provide a cheap labor base and stable market place so that multinational
corporations could exploit a beneficial economic situation. Second, the U.S. did not
support sanctions because South Africa was anti-Communist and pro-Western. Minter
states;
In short, if one accepted the objective of a pro-Western anticommunist stability in
South Africa—virtually all Western policymakers did—it made sense to apply
significant pressures against apartheid only if its opponents posed a realistic threat
of escalating unrest and disruption. Otherwise, it was logical to confine anti¬
apartheid actions to symbolism.'®*
Over the years. United States policymakers did not even utter the word “sanctions,” even
though such a strategy might have led to a peaceful, diplomatic, and non-violent
transition from a morally corrupt political and economic system to the South Africa of




might not be enough to end such an oppressive regime. From 1964-1977, the primary
policymaking bodies in the U.S. made every effort to delay sanctions against South
Africa, particularly the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) which was vehemently
opposed to divestment. The Council remained steadfast in its policy of non-interference
in the domestic affairs of South Africa. Their argument was one which bespoke caution
and circumvention about the key issues of human rights and economic exploitation. The
members of the CFR strongly recommended that the U.S. adopt a policy of non¬
intervention. Minter points out:
A parallel policy book from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Waldemar
Nielsen African Battleline, while advocating more U.S. sympathy for African
views, was cautious on specifics. Nielsen conceded that United States might
eventually have to give in to mandatory sanction, in order to affirm the
“fundamental and controlling” importance of the rule of law. But such a course,
he implied, should be delayed as long as possible. Because of the ominous
implications of a showdown in the United Nations over South West Africa, and in
view of its uncertain outcome, it is of the highest importance that U.S. policy
directed to averting such a confrontation.'®®
Policymakers did not push for sanctions. The AAM continued their push for a non¬
violent approach. There were times that the general population was out of touch with the
AAM.
The idea of sanctions received little publicity in the U.S. For over eighteen years,
the AAM had been without any major input or support from an international organization
with the exception of TransAfnca. It appears that AAM leadership during these years did
not enter the consciousness of the American public. Americans were generally unaware
' ®®Dennis Herbstein, “A Role for Activist,”Africa Report, v40nl, (Winter 1995), p.36-39.
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that U.S. foreign policy and multinational corporations facilitated the oppressive system
of Apartheid. Equally apparent, from 1959-1977, Americans, black and white, were only
gradually exposed to the problems or solutions connected with the South African
government. Denis Heberstein points out, “The divestment debate took a different and, at
first, slower path in the United States. At first, Harry Belafonte was a lone voice focusing
on Apartheid.”"® So black South Africans fought against the South African government
alone, American foreign policy establishment, and multinational corporations of General
Electric, Honeywell, Mobil Oil, Shell, Ford, Colgate, Kodak, IBM, Coca Cola, General
Motors, British Petroleum, and host of others made tremendous profits from the cheap
labor of black South Africans.
However, during the years of 1977-1984, AAM began to grow stronger. In the
policy arena, the AAM emerged as an internationally recognized vehicle of dissent. There
are several factors to explain this turnaround. First, the conflicts and injustices in
Southern Africa began to receive international attention. Second, the anti-Apartheid
movement purposefiilly developed allies in two places: Congress and a number of foreign
bureaucracies and countries. Third, activism was encouraged at the local and state level
expanding the anti-Apartheid movement. Fourth, African Americans founded a foreign
policy organization called TransAfnca.
Clearly, the last factor was paramount because the AAM had built a foreign
policy organization that lobbied and mobilized support in the U.S on the domestic front.
Besides, there was a need for an organization that could agitate the foreign policy
"”lbid.,37.
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establishment in Washington D. C. It could articulate that United States policies
regarding South Africa were both racist and dehumanizing. This organization became a
communication vehicle that would explain to the American people that many
multinational corporations, including some with brand names familiar in everyday life,
exploited black South Africans for high return on their investments. Also, the time was
right for some knowledgeable, committed organization to promote high profile activism
in the anti-Apartheid movement. This organization would coalesce with other anti-
Apartheid structures, help turn the movement into a global one, and respond to the
impassioned call for freedom Chief Albert Luthuli, a South African freedom fighter,
made in 1959. Ultimately, Luthuli supported sanctions against South Africa because he




FOR A NEW POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA BY FORMING
LINKAGES INTERNATIONALLY
A cogent discussion of lobbying requires a descriptive analysis of the approach
taken by TransAfrica to connect with the global anti-Apartheid movement. TransAfrica
recognized there was a missing element in U S. foreign policy and took a fourfold
strategic approach to its goal of freedom for black South Africa. One, it had to form
relationships with the organizations in South Africa. Two, it had to gain recognition from
the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), a powerful anti-imperialist voice in the struggle
for freedom throughout Africa. Third, TransAfrica had to convince the foreign policy
establishment in Washington that African-Americans had a viable self interest in the
liberation of South Africa that translated into political leverage. Fourth, TransAfrica had
to lobby committees in the Senate and House of Representatives in order to substantiate
the importance of the issue. It had to convince congressional Republicans and
Democrats, liberals and conservatives alike, of the importance of a sanctions bill. There
had been previous efforts, such as those of Congressman Diggs of Michigan, who had
tried for years to get a bill supporting sanctions out of the Africa Subcommittee. His
legislative initiatives proved unsuccessfiil, as did a very few other, largely ignored
campaigns mounted by international interest groups whose influence was diminished by
the powerful corporations that lobbied Congress on a regular basis weaker.
76
77
Nevertheless, TransAfrica was not deterred nor discouraged. It stressed the
importance of working within the political system. TransAfrica maintained a vision,
which was to support a sanctions bill designed to pressure the South African government
into change. TransAfrica provided a strategic and logistical framework for successful
lobbying, primarily because of the knowledge and leadership that Robinson exhibited
concerning political committees and how they worked, interest groups (whom he
convinced to support pro-African groups), and general knowledge of such little-known
organizations as the Washington Office on Africa and the America Committee on Africa.
Above all, the importance of lobbying Congress was emphasized in every meeting with
both domestic and international leaders. Robinson’s lobbying efforts highlighted the
economic shortsightedness of U.S. foreign policy in South Africa as well as a growing
interest of the average African-American in the plight of the country. Membership in
TransAfrica had increased to over ten thousand members, most ofwhom voted. All in all,
Robinson was very successful in transforming neutral or negative attitudes into concrete,
positive plans of action to end Apartheid in South Africa.
The growing influence of TransAfrica became apparent when Ambassador
Andrew Young was (some felt unfairly) dismissed from his highly influential position at
the United Nations. Robinson admonished President Carter. “We have been all too alone
in our protests of growing intimacy between Israel and the state of South Africa.”"'
Robinson convinced African-Americans to fax and telephone the White House, and,
'Randall Robinson, “Message to the President on the Resignation ofAmbassador Andrew Young and on United
States with theMiddle East and Africa,” TransAfrica News Report, (Summer 1979), 124.
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African-Americans answered the request, flooding the President with their disapproval of
his decision. A key issue in the dismissal of Young had been the Israel-South Africa
connection and his objections to the continuation of Apartheid. To protest the dismissal,
TransAfrica asked its ten thousand members to express to the Executive branch of its
disapproval by encouraging members to write letters, make telephone calls, and send
telegrams to the White House protesting the mistreatment ofYoung.
Though these efforts were effective, TransAfrica realized that the contribution it
sought to make to the dismantling of Apartheid must extend to and connect with African
organizations in Africa. So TransAfrica established relationships beyond the boundaries
of the U.S. with organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In
1980, the OAU meeting of Heads of State of government took place in Sierra Leone.
TransAfrica was acknowledged as the representative of African American interests, key
among them, the anti-Apartheid struggle. Along with the OAU, TransAfrica criticized the
role of Western corporations that exploited cheap black South African labor and
maintained the vicious system of Apartheid. Together, both organizations exposed the
ties multinational corporations enjoyed with an exploitive economic system that
supported huge profits for some but poverty and degradation for others. During the
initial meeting, OAU elevated TransAfrica to the functional level ofCouncil ofMinisters,
which was the most powerfiil committee in the organization. As a member of the Council
of Ministers, TransAfrica was afforded an opportunity to draft a declaration criticizing
Western corporations. This honor was quite unusual for an organization that was just over
three years old. But there were disagreements. For example, TransAfrica criticized the
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role of the Sullivan Principles, a group ofeconomic and social initiatives proposed by the
highly respected Reverend Leon Sullivan of Opportunities Industrialization Centers of
America, believing them to be irrelevant to the aspirations and goals of black South
Africans. Though at this point a fledgling organization, TransAfrica engendered enough
respect to be taken seriously in its criticism. In sum, forming such alliances as that with
OAU allowed TransAfrica to greatly expand its influence throughout Africa.
In the meantime, TransAfrica’s approach to lobbying was expanded and modified
as its exposure to the plight of black South Africans broadened. Participating in a forum
like the one in Sierra Leone allowed a broader understanding of issues in the international
community, and their status in the international world increased tremendously. At this
pivotal conference, TransAfrica cemented its role by drafting resolutions to influence
policies that affected Africa and the Caribbean and especially South Africa. The
members of the OAU viewed the newly forged linkages of TransAfrica to Africa as
verification that this American organization believed in and supported the anti-Apartheid
movement. The presence of TransAfrica also provided a unique opportunity to dialogue
on a U.S. foreign policy that exploited black South Africans, while at the same time,
permitting TransAfrica to solidify its role as an international lobbying firm. Jackson
says:
At the annual TransAfrica fundraising benefit earlier, Tanzania’s Ambassador to the
U.N. Salim A. Salim, who then served as President of the General Assembly,
keynoted the occasion, providing further witness to TransAfrica’s kindred links to the
African continent."^
^^^Henry F. Jackson, From The Congo To Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy TowardAfrica Since I960 (New York;
William Morrow and Company, 1982), 125.
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Although TransAfrica forged a firm relationship with the Organization of African
Unity and, by extension, the anti-Apartheid movement, it ran into some opposition while
lobbying Congress during the years of 1977-1979. During those years, little progress was
made and frustration was pervasive. However, TransAfrica continued onward, pressing
Congress to pass a sanctions bill. Robinson testified during several Congressional
hearings and met with various members of Senate staffs, thus personalizing the issue.
Moreover, he wrote letters to African-American leaders, encouraging them to remain
supportive and delineating the issues that were to be communicated to the community at
large. But at times, the battle for a sanctions bill seemed futile and Robinson found
himself feeling cynical and pessimistic with Congress because of their often recalcitrant
attitudes. In spite of the obstacles, Robinson continued to debate with any subcommittee
or Congressional action group on the subject of sanctions. There were hearings during
which Robinson was bombarded with questions or comments that had nothing to do with
sanctions or South Africa, signifying outright disinterest or a strategy designed to deflect
attention from basic economic and social issues. Robinson stated:
I arrived at this rudimentary wisdom through painful experience. For the first two
years of TransAfrica’s existence, I testified before congressman who talked to
their staff members throughout my increasingly spiritless readings. I organized
letters from black leaders to the congressmen who hadn’t listened to my
testimony—or, from what I could see, to anyone else’s on the subject."^
"^Randall Robinson, Defending The Spirit: A Black Life in America (New York: Penguin Group, 1999), 110.
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For example, during a hearing with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Jesse Helms, a rabid segregationist, asked, “How much did my suit cost me and
how I could afford it?”"" Randall explained in later years that the key strategy during that
period was to focus all efforts on Congress regardless of the ignorance of the
policymakers who had no knowledge of Africa or who chose to pervert the basic issues.
Robinson knew that lobbying requires cultivating relationships with members of
Congress who could be rude and ignorant. But TransAfrica had to persevere in its efforts
to persuade Congress to pass a sanctions bill, no matter how unlikely such an occurrence
seemed. At times, the struggle faltered, but TransAfrica continued to testify before
hearings and speak out in public about the issue of Apartheid. TransAfrica was now
recognized as a lobbying firm that spoke out on international issues, especially Apartheid,
by the White House, Congress, and State Department. Eventually, with both domestic
and international support, persistence paid off. The sanctions bill was passed.
In the early years from 1977-1979, long before the sanctions bill was passed,
TransAfrica achieved some lobbying victories, thus encouraging the organization to
continue. Robinson noted:
Without our work, the United States would have lifted the economic sanctions on
trade vdth Rhodesia long before this year, and the London conference [which
prepared the way for Black majority rule in Zimbabwe] would not have happened.
When he was Prime Minister, Muzorewa tried to get Washington to lift the





These small victories were important to TransAfrica’s image within the foreign
policy establishment. Ron Dellums of the House Armed Services Committee, Stephen
Solarz of the Subcommittee on Africa, in the Senate Dick Clark of the Subcommittee on
African Affairs, and Senator Edward Kennedy, the powerful senior senator from
Massachusetts, were especially supportive of TransAfrica’s efforts, calling upon
Robinson’s opinions and support on issues associated with Africa in general and South
Africa in particular. Those matters that related to South Africa were a priority for two
Committees. In the Senate, the Subcommittee on African Affairs led by Dick Clark and
in the House ofRepresentatives, the Subcommittee on Africa led by Stephen Solarz, were
particularly concerned with conditions in South Africa. These two statesmen were in a
sensitive position and needed the guidance of TransAfrica, which testified before these
subcommittees on a regular basis. As a result of the alliance between TransAfrica and
these powerful politicians, the subcommittees united to defeat the so-called Byrd
Amendment, which was antithetical to the goals of dismantling the evils of Apartheid.
Donald Culverson has stated;
Congressional action during 1977 and 1979 reflected the high priority that the
regionalists attached to Africa. Dick Clark, for example, who chaired the Senate
Subcommittee on African Affairs from 1975 to 1978, played a major role in
policy liberalization. The House Subcommittee on Africa re-convened in 1977
and resumed its role of addressing the southern Africa conflict. The pinnacle of
cooperation between the executive and legislative branches on African affairs
occurred that year, when the administration sponsored Congress’s repeal of the
Byrd’s Amendment, which had allowed repression of dissent. Congress,
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meanwhile, through the subcommittees, emerged as one of the most vital forums
for contesting the administration’s position.”®
The repeal of the Byrd Amendment was, in fact, a victory for TransAfrica, which
emphasized the importance of allowing dissidents the chance to speak out against the
Apartheid government. The lobbying of the earlier years seemed, at first, not to be that
influential in its political marketing of the anti-Apartheid movement in Congress. But
TransAfrica was gaining prestige, not only with the OAU, the African National Congress,
and the foreign policy establishment, but in the years to follow, TransAfrica’s unrelenting
lobbying efforts would slowly help change the minds ofCongress, the White House, and
State Department.
In its role of influencing U.S. foreign policy, TransAfrica sometimes experienced
many challenges. Over the years. Representative Charles Diggs (D-Michigan) had
attempted without success to influence the House Africa Subcommittee to pass favorable
legislation against Apartheid. Robinson asks:
What could we reasonably expect from approaches to the conventional
establishment forces? The prospects there seemed dim indeed. After all, the
chairman of the House Africa Subcommittee, Charles Diggs, could not coax the
subcommittee to approve even modest sanctions against South Africa.'”
The complicated issue of ending Apartheid was also troubling because previous U. S.
presidents and policy-makers promoted and supported initiatives that actually sustained
"^Donald Culverson, “The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the U.S., 1969-1986,” Political Science
Quarterly, vUnl, (Spring 1996), 128-129.
117 'RsaidaU Robinson, Defending The Spirit: A Black Life In America (New York: Penguin Group, 1998), 109.
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the white minority government in South Africa. There were policies such as containment,
detente, constructive engagement, and a position paper designated NSSM 39, all ofwhich
further entrenched and solidified the official government position. “NSSM 39, by way of
explanation, is a thorough and very influential background study of relations between the
United States and southern Africa that was prepared by knowledgeable operatives of
various Republican administrations.”"* The infamous NSSM 39 was primarily authored
by Henry Kissinger, Director of the National Security Agency in 1969. Kissinger wrote,
“The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is
through them.”"^ This level of cooperation between South Africa and the U.S involved
economic, intelligence, and military exchange and cooperation. The on-going support
from South Africa supposedly helped the U.S. contain the threat of Soviet intervention in
the southern African region. As such. South Africa was viewed as a Western ally in that
region of the world that must be given support. Ferkiss and Hans Morgenthau have
stated:
American interest is only a by-product of the East-West struggle. Both stated
that the United States is not engaged in a moral crusade in Africa to end
imperialism and colonialism, to establish self-government and majority rule. They
are right in the sense that American policy in Africa is inevitably linked to its total
foreign policy. That foreign policy, for whatever reasons, is committed to
competition and cooperation with Russia, to national self-determination and
majority rule or consensus, and to prevention of armed aggression by any nation,
including Communist ones. It is perhaps justifiable to say that American foreign
^^®Khawas-El A. Mohamed and Barry Cohen, The Kissinger Study ofSouthern AJnca: National Study
Memorandum 39 (New York: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1976 ), 17.
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policy attempts to keep the peace in terms of the lesson of the past. It is in this
framework that American policy in Africa can best be understood.*^
Jennifer Davis makes it clear that Great Britain, France, West Germany, and the
United States lent a hand to the Apartheid government. She states that, “all gave
Apartheid South Africa the status of a reliable (even if sometimes embarrassing) Western
ally in the global confrontation with communism.”'^* She posits that TransAfrica would
have to overcome:
Anti-apartheid rhetoric that waxed and waned through the Kennedy, Johnson,
Nixon, Carter, Reagan administrations, most U S. policymakers, corporate and
political, treated minority-ruled South Africa as the regional power to be favored
and protected from destabilizing forces.
Moreover, Robinson believed that African-Americans had failed to pay attention
to foreign policy, thus issuing a challenge. He summarized the problem:
For in this failure can be discovered the limits of African-Americans foreign
influence, limits imposed by a powerful and traditional white foreign policy
establishment and nearly as vigorously and as frequently, African-American
opinion makers and leaders who remain trammeled by the unconscious belief that
foreign policy causes warrant their attention and support only when they derive
legitimacy and prominence from the very white mainstream institutions
traditionally arrayed against them.'^^
Other, more specific policies worked to undermine TransAfrica’s efforts in South Africa.
For instance. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker authored the “Policy of
A. Davis and James K. Baker, ^‘Southern African in Transitionf 1966, XV.
^^^■JenniferDavis, “South Africa,” In Focus, 1, 22 (January 1997), 2.
^2%id., 2
^^^RandaU Robinson, Defending The Spirit: A BlackLife in America andRandall Robinson (New York: Penguin
Group, 1998), 120.
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Constmctive Engagement” during the administration of President Ronald Reagan (1980-
1988). This policy bolstered the government of South Africa by making it crystal clear
that the U S. would support Apartheid and not help blacks in South Africa. Crocker
states:
Constructive engagement clearly was not aimed at helping the black population of
South Africa rid itself of the oppressive and exploitative white minority regime;
rather, it was designed to preempt Soviet backed revolutionary change and to find
ways to incorporate South Africa-as a respected member of the Western defense
system-in the struggle against Soviet expansionism.’^'*
Furthermore, NSSM 39 and Constructive Engagement supported the policy of Apartheid
in South Africa. These foreign policies did not criticize or condemn the human right
violations committed by the South Africa government against the indigenous peoples of
the country. Indeed, human rights were not a consideration in the formulation of policy
for the United States or the west. The U.S. supported South African military incursions
into the sovereign countries of southern Africa by not condenming these actions in the
United Nations, failing to sponsor legislation to divest U.S. interests in South Africa, and
failing to condemn Apartheid. These policies centered on profit for major corporations
and on preventing the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in southern Africa, not on
preventing the suffering of innocent human beings. Kissinger’s Memorandum 39 states
that the U.S. government should:
Maintain public opposition to colonial and racial policies in southern Africa but to
pursue a quiet policy, which relaxes political and economic restrictions on the
white states. The desire to increase communication and selective involvement
with colonial and settler regimes on the theory that persuasion would be more
^^■’BemardMagubane, “Reagan and South Africa,” TransAfrica Forum, 6, 3 and 4, (Spring and Sununer 1989),
42.
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likely than would condemnation to bring about changes in their policies and racial
practices.
According to Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, “Kissinger’s policy
rested not on moral considerations, nor on concern for human rights and fundamental
democratic principles.”'^® This policy was one ofmany examples of legal and legislative
pronouncements regarding South Africa in which human rights abuses were totally
ignored by members of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Again, the problem for
TransAfrica was an apparent indifference to black South Africans who suffered severe
hardships, in part, because policy experts in Washington would not confront Pretoria on
human rights issues of constitutional disenfranchisement, residential displacement,
systematic violence, and unwarranted incarceration. The State Department carried out
directives on behalf of the United States that tended to ignore the moral and human rights
implications implicit in official attitudes. TransAfrica was confronted with a dilemma
because the poverty, oppression, and disenfranchisement of black South Africa were
subordinated to the economic and strategic advantages of friendly relationships with the
South African government.
Over the years, policymakers in the United States government made it clear that
South Africa would not receive the same kind of legislative consideration as other
countries with human rights abuses. Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen state that
'^®Kha\vas-El A. Mohamed and Barry Cohen, The KissingerStudyOfSouthern Africa. National Security Study
Memorandum 39 (New York: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1976), 29.
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the true purpose ofNSSM 39 was to render the State Department powerless. They point
out that, “Director ofNational Security Kissinger wanted to set up the general framework
for Nixon’s South African policy and turn it over to the powerless State Department to
handle, with instructions to encourage the ruling government to minimize the use of
violence and to encourage peaceful change.”'^’ The reactionary policies of this
administration laid the groundwork for a convenient set of policies that neither blamed
nor denied wrongdoing by the South African government, but was not a forceful
statement for change either. Long before TransAfrica was founded, policies that many in
the Senate agreed with and approved of were codified and would present logistical
impediments for TransAfrica when the time came to lobby for change.
Moreover, as Schraeder states, “despite historical and cultural ties between the
U.S. and the African continent, there existed no consensus within the framework ofU.S.
foreign policy.”'^* The NSSM 39 policy was instituted during the Nixon-Kissinger
administration and it was clear, based on that document alone, that black South African
aspirations for full citizenship and humane treatment would not be considered during this
period. Regarding NSSM 39, El-Khawas and Cohen posit that “NSSM 39 is the complete
lack of concern over the aspirations and fate of the African people.’”^® TransAfrica would
'^^Ibid.,28.
'^*Peter J. Schraeder, Unites States Foreign Policy TowardAfrica After The EndOfThe Cold War (Chicago:
Loyola University, 1994), 2.
'^^Khawas-El A. Mohamed and Cohen, Barry, The KissingerStudy OfSouthern Africa (New York: Lawrence Hill
and Company, 1976), 31.
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indeed, as a primary goal, have to convince the policymakers that black South Africans
deserved the same kind of humanitarian attention given to other countries such as Ireland,
Israel, and Egypt.
One optimistic note as affirmed by Schraeder, indicates that “Other members of
Congress underscore the humanitarian or moral imperatives, which link the U.S. to
Africa.’”^” The association between Africa and the United States has been contradictory.
Since the founding of the republic in 1789, except for its value in the slave trade, sub-
Saharan Africa has been viewed with indifference. America felt, along with other
European nations, that Africa could provide essential resources and cheap labor, but even
into the twentieth century, long after the slave trade was abolished, there was a kind of
benign neglect concerning the economic and political progress of the indigenous people.
The CIA and other clandestine, sometimes private mercenary groups continued to foment
discontent and political confusion so that European governments could continue to
exploit the people there. TransAfrica would have to accept the fact that policies toward
South Africa were often created out of ignorance, greed, or indifference. So TransAfrica
faced the challenge of promoting a role for the United States that was not based on South
Africa’s strategic military location or the profit motive.
Immanuel Wallerstein argues, “Despite the linkages, Africanists generally agree
that U.S. Africa policies from the founding of the Republic in 1789 to the present have
been marked by indifference, at worst, and neglect, at best.”'^' The policymakers in
Washington who served in official capacities in the U.S. Senate complicated the problem
130TOd., 2.
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for TransAfrica because of their lack of knowledge about and negative perceptions of
Africa. Schraeder explains;
Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
(D-New York) as reported in 1987 by the New York Times, for example,
underscores the gap of knowledge concerning Africa among some elected
officials. Africa has been treated as backwater in official policymaking circles,
compared to the time and resources allocated to other regions considered worth
greater concern.
In essence, policymakers have lacked expertise, knowledge, history, and
understanding in formulating relevant human rights policy in Africa, particularly
southern Africa. It is very important to understand that the media played a role in the
problem also, especially when magazines like the National Geographic generated (to
some extent) stereotypical images of “lush jungles and wild animals.”'” As a result, the
public was unaware that, for example, African jungles comprise only four percent of that
continent and that every business day, businesspersons dressed in Western-style suits
report to offices in financial hubs, such as Abidjan and Nairobi.'” It is quite apparent that
TransAfrica’s problems were intensified because the general public and Congress did not
have the necessary knowledge to make an informed judgment, often because ofdeliberate
and savage-like images portrayed in movies and magazines. These images, along with
'^‘Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa and theModem WorldQAe'w York: AfricaWorld Press, 1986), 80.
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Cold War politics, were an impediment to the goals of the anti-Apartheid movement.
Schraeder elaborates;
Rather than being regarded as important in their own right, African countries were
perceived by U.S. policymakers as a means for preventing the advances of Soviet
communism, and therefore U.S. relationships with Africa regimes evolved
according to relative importance within an East-West framework.
TransAfrica was concerned that power politics distorted the true needs of black South
Africans. The question was how would TransAfrica change the paradigm from East-West
relations to human rights? In years past, policymakers had relegated South Africa to a
cheap source of labor and a strategic bulwark against Communism. It appeared in the
early days of TransAfrica that policymakers were not ready to change that viewpoint
under any circumstances. TransAfrica was confronting paradigms that were supportive
of oppressive governments, on the one hand, while presenting a fa9ade as a beacon of
liberty on the other. Despite rhetoric about democracy and equality as a human
entitlement, the role of Africa was fimdamentally circumscribed in the containment
policies of the Truman Administration. These policies were to hinder Soviet influence in
Africa and to provide raw materials, so that multinational corporations, among his most
faithful political supporters, could reap huge profits. Schraeder confirms, “The various
strategies of containment initially outlined by the Truman administration [were] applied
to Africa, albeit in varying forms, during the Cold War era.”’^®Clearly, the policies of
containment have been Washington’s preoccupation, for containment does little to force
136‘Ibid.
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change. Policymakers, though aware of the excesses of the Apartheid regimes in South
Africa, continued to support the government “as a regional bulwark against
communism.”'^’ TransAfrica would have to accept the fact that containment policies
resulted in many unforeseen aggressive initiatives, such as proxy wars like the one
against Angola. The South African government was directly involved in the Angolan
Civil War and the United States did not protest to any significant extent. In other words,
TransAfrica would have to learn that containment policies were characterized by regional
battles played out in Africa to counter the perceived threat of Soviet influence in the
region and that the model for carrying out foreign policy in a Cold War framework was
not always successful as the South African defeat in Angola proved. Therefore, one of
TransAfrica’s goals would be to explain to policymakers that in the very near future, as
more African countries fought and won independence, it would be an advantage to
facilitate the transition to black majority rule and democracy in South Africa or become a
part of the violence and chaos that in the long run might provide a Soviet advantage at the
least and financial ruin for many corporations at the most. Schraeder states;
Washington’s containment policies in Africa was the emergence of the continent
as a battlefield for proxy wars as both the U S. and the former Soviet Union
became involved in regional conflicts. In almost every case, regional conflict was
exacerbated by one superpower’s reaction to the other’s involvement in a
particular crisis situation.'^*
TransAfrica realized that another problem for the organization itself was eminent. In
order to maintain an international profile, testify before Congress, meet with members of
'^’Ibid., 9.
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the foreign policy establishment and the Congressional Black Caucus, establish
relationships with liberal members of Congress, conduct boycotts, visit various cities,
engage the media, keep speaking engagements, provide office supplies, and so many
other things, TransAfrica would need a significant cash flow. It was crystal clear that
assistance would not come from corporate America, which had invested billions of
dollars in the Apartheid system and received handsome profits on their investments.
Robinson realized that corporate indifference had to be changed despite the chances of
limited success in the long run. In the short run, the more successes, the more potential
for financial support. He expresses his opinion thusly:
TransAfrica’s task was to effect a 180-degree turn in American policy toward
South Africa and the general region. How could this be done? We had no money
and no reliable place to find it in large amounts. Virtually none could be expected
from the corporate community. Some three hundred corporations had invested
upwards of two billion dollars in an apartheid system who labor inequities
produced extraordinary returns on investment.
The notion of working within a foreign policy establishment that did not even
understand simple basics about Africa seemed impossible. One foreign policy arm of the
government was the Council on Foreign Relations. However, as Minter points out:
A survey among members of the elite Council on Foreign Relations showed no
significant support for any action that might bring effective sanctions in any form
against South Africa for the purpose ofchanging its domestic racial order.
‘^^Randall Robinson, Defending The Spirit: A BlackA Black Life In America (New York: Penguin Group, 1998),
109.
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Ultimately, there was nothing to be gained from working with such groups because of
their entrenched viewpoint and lack of sensitivity to the plight of black South Africans.
So Robinson was forced to rely on donations, TransAfrica membership dues, and donated
services. As the years progressed, TransAfrica began to receive more and more financial
support, but in the beginning, it was almost operating on the proverbial shoestring. Still,
the effort to win the support of the political establishment continued.
Henry Kissinger represented the opinions of many who were more concerned
about Europe and the Soviets than about Africans who had (in their minds) little power
and even less human worth. TransAfrica knew the foreign policy establishment was
unresponsive to the treatment of black South Africans. Randall states;
Many thoughtfiil African Americans saw possible value in surmounting the de
facto barriers to black membership in virtually all white old-line foreign policy
ballast organizations like the Council on Foreign Relations. But what had Council
members ever done, save bury human suffering abroad in esoteric writings and
pedantic talks? After all. Council was and remains a citadel of motionless hand-
wringing where the parameters for suggested foreign policy adjustment are so
close as to touch each other. What could prospective African-American members
hope for, in any case, sharing membership in the Council with the likes of foreign
policy’s Henry Kissinger, who seemed to think that a human right was a punch
landed by a prizefighter?
In other words, TransAfrica needed to review its approach to marketing the positive
aspects of a free black South Africa. Thus TransAfrica decided, after numerous strategy
meetings, to add an educational dimension to conventional negotiations with the
establishment in their battle to win supporters, particularly African American supporters.
With the reinforcement of public opinion, TransAfrica could then negotiate from a
'‘"Randall Robinson, Defending The Spirit: A Black Struggle inAmerica (New York: Penguin Group, 199), 109.
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position of strength and even increase financial viability. TransAfrica would reveal,
under this plan of action, to African Americans and the American public at large, and in
as many ways possible, the injustice of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa. Using
simple, direct language along with personalized examples, Robinson would interpret
foreign policy, especially for African Americans audiences. Policymakers had in many
ways made policy issues difficult for African Americans to comprehend, sometimes even
confusing or hiding the most important aspects of issues vis-a-vis the African continent;
so clarity was needed. Also, Robinson had to make the struggle in South Africa relevant
to everyday citizens, who tended to be more concerned and more aware of domestic
issues. Robinson states:
We had to find a way to set our own terms and break the longstanding control of
the anonymous graybeard policy bullies. With an even firmer conviction, we had
to assume that they had not the faintest idea of what they were doing or talking
about. Foreign policymaking, as near to a science as phrenology, had to be
demystified. Americans had to be made aware of all the needless hurt that been
caused in their name. African-Americans had to be made to understand that this
American policy affront to Africa was an insult to them as well.*'*^
One of the ways in which TransAfrica would exhibit its greatest tactical success
was in the mobilization of social activists to fight for the cause of black South African
liberation. These social activists ranged from sports figures, to students and faculty at
colleges and universities, to socially responsive investment associations, to government
and civil rights organizations, and average citizens. TransAfrica utilized these high
profile, committed, and energetic individuals to bring attention to foreign policies that
142'Ibid, 110.
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influenced and helped to sustain Apartheid. These institutions consisted of Congress, the
State Department, and the White House among others. TransAfrica knew that outcries
from the general public over human rights violations in South Africa could gain the
attention of the media which traditionally ignored Africa. In particular, there were few
comprehensive stories concerning the oppressed lifestyles of black South Africans.
TransAfrica worked with the media to promote narratives and editorial commentary that
showed the American public what it was like to be black in South Africa. It showed great
perception in surmising that the citizenry acted only when an issue became important,
and importance was conferred by exposure in the media. Once the issue reached this level
of importance, TransAfrica was of interest to the public and the public, of course, were
potential voters, who could make a difference. After gaining needed media attention,
scrutiny of oppressive policies not only in South Africa but also Namibia and Zimbabwe
was inevitable. TransAfrica examined the negotiation process in Zimbabwe. They stayed
abreast with Ian Smith’s relationship with the Carter Administration to make sure the
process favored the Zimbabwean people. And, they monitored the transition of power
from minority to majority rule. Media attention and citizen activism could make the
policymakers accountable. Robinson stated, “From this new attention, we thought, would
follow accountability for policymakers, and thus better and more humane American
policies.’”''^
Once the attention of the public had been gained, TransAfrica had to determine
how to heighten grassroots involvement. There was abundant evidence to prove that the
‘"^Ibid., 111.
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U S. foreign policy had aligned itselfwith the South African government, and the public
needed to know that the United States was participating in anti-democratic, anti-humanist
activities. Donald Culverson says:
In October 1984 the United States abstained from voting on a UN Security
Council resolution condemning South Africa’s Apartheid policies. Later that
month. Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale charged the Reagan
administration with disregarding human rights and allying itself to reactionary
rather than reformist forces.'"^
Robinson was convinced that with strong leadership from TransAfrica and the
publicizing of activities among South African freedom fighters, America’s basic sense of
fairness would force Congress to begin to review its antiquated stance. Concomitantly,
TransAfrica had to show leadership in the global anti-Apartheid movement without
displacing or impinging on the activities of existing organizations. To extend the social
movement that would transform a policy of complicity in the interest of exploitable profit
in South Africa, TransAfrica had to target all areas of injustice: legal, economic, and
political. For Apartheid to end, however, it soon became apparent that all organizations
had to be mobilized to work together under one umbrella. Some of these groups included
the Washington Office on Africa (WOA), the American Committee on Africa (ACOA),
the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), and the Interfaith Center for Corporate
Responsibility (ICCR). These groups were very diverse and represented specialized
‘‘'^Donald R. Culverson, “The politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United States,”Political Science
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98
interests. They included cultural activists, public employee associations, faculties at the
university and college level, and socially responsible investment associations.
Aside from mobilizing activism at the grassroots level, TransAfrica had to
convince corporations, universities, colleges, state, and local governments to reexamine
their connections to the Apartheid government of South Africa. The new dynamics in the
movement compelled TransAfrica to form new relationships with groups that were
established and others that were fairly new in the anti-Apartheid movement. The older
groups were well-established to carry out tactics and strategies of civil disobedience,
demonstrations, boycotts, and protests under one banner, but they also had to allow
TransAfrica the opportunity to contribute to the movement. Most of the organizations did
not object because all were in agreement on the common objective to dismantle
Apartheid in South Africa. TransAfrica, in turn, openly acknowledged the opinions,
history, accomplishments, longevity, and leadership of these organizations which had
been around long before TransAfrica. Nevertheless, TransAfrica’s interactions with
Congress and the White House were closely examined, as was the make-up and
background of the board members. TransAfrica, however, was composed of members
who were professional activists in their own right. Jackson describes some of the
members;
TransAfrica founding members were Ronald Waters, a professor of political science
at Howard University; C. Payne Lucas, chief of Africare Inc.; Willard R. Johnson, a
scholar and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations; Herschelle Challenor and
Randall Robinson, who worked as aides to Diggs, who was Chairman of the House
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Subcommittee on Africa. This group recruited Richard Hatcher, Mayor of Gary,
Indiana, to head TransAfrica’s board of directors.'"'^
A number of the members had tried to establish a foreign policy body on behalf of
African-Americans, and some of them had worked on Capitol Hill such as Robinson,
who had been a part of the staff ofCongressman Diggs. Robinson’s knowledge of the
political processes on the Hill elevated him to the status of a person who was often seen
and heard in the anti-Apartheid movement. Culverson states:
Perhaps the most significant organizational development in the anti-apartheid
movement during this period was the formation of TransAfrica in 1977. It was a
product of increased black American interest in foreign affairs and became one of the
most vocal and consistent critics of Apartheid. Like the House Subcommittee on
Africa, its leadership is a cadre of professional activists, most ofwhom are veterans
of earlier efforts to establish a permanent Afro-American foreign policy organization.
TransAfrica’s most visible representative, executive director Randall Robinson,
formerly worked on Representative Digg’s staff. TransAfrica extended the anti¬
apartheid network without displacing other groups.’"^
Moreover, to extend the network of activists in America itself, TransAfrica enlarged
its supporters to include traditional African-American organizations, including the People
United to Save Humanity (PUSH) and the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP). On the governmental end, Robinson was frequently meeting
‘''^Henry F. Jackson, From The Congo To Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy TowardAfrica Since I960, (New York:
William Marrow and Company, 1982), 124.
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with Richard Moose, the Assistant Secretary State for African Affairs during the Carter
Administration. On the Congressional side, Robinson extended his mobilization efforts to
include the Subcommittee on Africa chaired by Stephen Solarz in the House of
Representative. This kind of personal involvement strategy reached into the halls of
Congress. Jackson declares:
In the political system TransAfrica proved extraordinarily effective in mobilizing
governmental and Black leadership in foreign affairs. It developed a close
working relationship with such civil rights organizations as the National
Association for the Advancement ofColored People (NAACP) and People United
to Save Humanity (PUSH). Robinson consulted regularly with such members of
the Carter Administration as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Richard Moose, and with congressional leaders such as Stephen J. Solarz, who
had replaced Diggs at the House Subcommittee on Africa.''’’
TransAfrica extended its influence throughout the anti-Apartheid movement, as
well as with government officials, the traditional civil rights organizations, the House of
Representatives and senatorial leaders. During this period, TransAfrica leadership was
careful not to impinge on the identities and purpose of the social activism of the other
anti-Apartheid groups. By coalescing in the struggle with these established groups such
as the Washington Office on Africa and American Committee on Africa, these
organizations became a formidable force speaking with one voice. Donald Culverson
‘'’’Henry F. Jackson, From The Congo To Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy TowardAfrica Since 1960 (New York:
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says, “While TransAfrica, ACOA, and WOA did not dominate the anti-Apartheid
movement, they capitalized on the enlargement of a social conscience constituency.”
In addition, TransAfrica proved that the general citizenry was capable of
contributing to the anti-Apartheid movement by influencing changes in international
policy. The role of the citizen would become vital in many ways. TransAfrica would
stand out among the other organizations in its ability to coordinate and structure
demonstrations. In the beginning, the leadership of TransAfrica decided that not only
were the national institutions mandatory in the process of persuading Congress to divest
in South Africa but a way had to be found to mobilize the general American public. They
realized that the public had to contribute to the isolation of the Apartheid government.
Robinson anticipated that there would be objections to any actions considered too radical,
so the concerns of the public were discussed at length. The goals and activities of
TransAfrica made the front pages of the New York Times and Washington Post after
some activists were arrested at the South African Embassy. The story of protests was
also carried in the International Herald Tribune. Although this kind ofpublicity was
noteworthy, mobilization of the public was growing, but still incomplete, in spite of the
exposure in the media. Robinson asserts;
We talked that morning for two hours about steps we could take to harness and
build on what was developing into a groundswell of support. We decided to set
up a steering committee ofnational organizations and leaders with TransAfnca
as the leading institution. The structure would exist, as first conceived, only for
coordination of continuing demonstrations and arrests at the embassy. We could
test the depth ofpublic interest and discover how far it would take us.*'*®
‘■'^Donald Culverson, “ TIk Politics Ofthe Anti-ApartheidMovement In The United States, 1969-1986,” Political
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In the interim, the public became involved in the movement through an activist vehicle
designated the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM). But more was needed. TransAffica
realized that lobbying Congress would have to be done in tandem with the mobilization
of the citizenry. More importantly, TransAfrica was allied with the people of South
Africa, who led the worldwide protest to dismantle Apartheid and with the cooperation of
the worldwide media, activist citizens, and organizations in the U.S., freedom for black
South Africans seemed imminent.
Signs of a mass insurgency in South Africa were also becoming more and more
apparent. Black South African freedom fighters stressed the importance of mobilizing all
sectors: students, citizens, black trade unions, the African National Congress, the United
Democratic Front, and labor leaders among others. Throughout the middle 1980s, their
efforts of defiance would make South Africa an increasingly ungovernable place. The
exiled leadership of the ANC encouraged all segments to create an environment that the
South Africa government could not manage. William Minter declares “The ANC 1985
New Year’ message stressed that [the black people] would have to make South Africa
ungovernable making the townships, in the first place, no-go zones for the South Africa
security forces and their collaborators.”'^ These groups carried out protests, rental
strikes, guerrilla attacks (the ANC), education boycotts in protest against inferior
'^■'^Randall Robinson, Defending The Spirit: A Black Life InAmerica (New York: Penguin Group, 1999), 155.
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education, and transportation boycotts, all ofwhich contributed to the atmosphere ofutter
defiance and chaos in South Africa. Minter points out;
Over the next year, before Pretoria banned TV cameras from the townships, the
pictures ofpolice and soldiers, shooting African youths left a powerful impression
throughout the world. Funerals attended by tens of thousands served as new
occasions for confrontation with authority when police tried to disperse mourners.
A mid-1985 state of emergency over much of the country, thousands of
detentions, the removal by arrest or sometimes death of a whole stratum of black
leadership—all failed to restore order. And while the regime still maintained the
undisputed military upper hand, the toll was not as unequal as in 1960 or 1976. As
many as one third of the deaths, it estimated, were black police or others
suspected of colloboration.'^’
An international television audience had witnessed, thanks to media coverage, just how
brutally the Apartheid government of South Africa could react in order to maintain white
supremacy. Black municipal workers, for example, went on a strike in Johannesburg.
The government retaliated with an extremely repressive response, deporting black South
Africans to their homelands, detaining leaders, banning protests, and killing freedom
fighters while in the custody of police. These events made a powerful impression on
TransAfrica as well as a worldwide viewership and motivated all to greater urgency.
Robinson viewed this predicament with a sense that time mattered and was totally aware
that the efforts of guerilla actions, transportation boycotts, trade union movements, youth
uprisings in the township, and rental strikes created instability. To this destabilization,
TransAfrica had to contribute, but how? This was an opportune moment for TransAfiica
because Apartheid was eroding and the aegis for divestment legislation seemed very
151 Ibid.
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timely. Together, TransAfrica, black South Africans, and worldwide opinion would
dismantle the Apartheid government at last.
At the same time that South Africans were utilizing all methods to destabilize the
government, TransAfrica decided to craft a strategy employing both civil disobedience
and political action. For the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) to be successful, civil
disobedience and peaceful protest would have to be the main tactics of the anti-Apartheid
movement. Marches and demonstrations would play a key role. To begin, the South
African Embassy in Washington D.C. was targeted for demonstrations 365 days out of
the year, beginning in 1986. Also, mass protests were instituted, with sit-ins being
utilized in all major cities in the U.S. These tactics increased public exposure and media
coverage from USA Today, the Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune, the Wall Street
Journal, the New York Times and the Washington Post. For the movement to succeed,
the FSAM knew that legislated sanctions were needed. The steering committee of
TransAfrica had always known the importance ofglobal sanctions and felt the time was
right for success in this area. These economic measures were the punitive actions that
would prove to be economically damaging for South Africa. In other words, civil
disobedience and divestment legislation would have to exist simultaneously for the
Apartheid government of South Africa to dismantle the laws, customs, and restrictions
that hampered black South Africans. As well, TransAfrica focused on two fronts:
conducting a campaign to gain support from members of Congress and publicly
implementing forms of civil disobedience with ad hoc groups. TransAfrica would lead
the FSAM with picketing, demonstrations, and arrests. In the halls of the Rayburn
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Building, TransAfrica lobbied Congressmen and women. TransAfrica combined
legislative action and civil disobedience into a successful strategic tool for action. There
was a sense of urgency and TransAfrica knew that an opportunity like this would never
happen again. So Robinson once more argued for a sanctions bill. Legislative action and
civil disobedience were inseparable, in his view. Robinson states:
As we talked on, we concluded that civil disobedience demonstrations,
notwithstanding their publicity value, were of no real consequence unless we could
push sanctions legislation through Congress on a parallel track. This was our chance
to impose on South Africa meaningful punitive economic measures. The chance
might never come again. We would have quickly design a campaign with synergistic
balance between demonstrations at the embassy and lobbying on Capital Hill. We
ended our discussion by agreeing on a name for the new national campaign.
On November 21, 1984, a new strategy in the anti-Apartheid movement was formally
approved by Robinson. This form of social activism would blend civil disobedience and
lobbying. It would unite other organizations, celebrities. Congressmen
and women, personalities, students, and citizens in the final assault on global Apartheid.
On this day, the name of the movement was officially designated the Free South Africa
Movement (FSAM). One of the strategies of the FSAM was to ask protestors to allow
themselves to be arrested at the South Afiican Embassy. So on a cold Thanksgiving Eve,
the following members of FSAM, in a well-publicized act of civil disobedience, were
arrested: Eleanor Holmes Norton, Randall Robinson, Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy,
and Civil Rights Commissioner Mary Frances Berry. In submitting to arrest, they
illustrated how pressure could be brought to bear on the South African government. A
152'Ibid., 155.
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wave of social activism was initiated throughout the nation. John Hope Franklin and
Alfred Moss, Jr. confirm;
Black Americans also took the initiative in pressing their government and the
American people to oppose injustice in another part of the world. On Thanksgiving
Eve, 1984, Randall Robinson, Executive Director of TransAfrica, Mary Frances
Berry of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Eleanor Holmes Norton of
the Georgetown Law Center, and Walter Fauntroy District of Columbia Delegate to
the House of Representatives, began a sit-in at the South African Embassy in
Washington to protest apartheid in general and the detention of Black South African
labor leaders in particular. This was the beginning of a sit-in campaign at the embassy
that lasted for more than a year and that led to the arrests of hundreds of people who
protested the racial policies of the Republic of South Africa. This surely had much to
do with encouraging the black majority in South Africa to fight more vigorously for
their rights and to arouse world opinion and indignation against apartheid.
The symbol of resistance of the movement became the South African Embassy. For
Americans, this represented a government that economically and politically devalued the
lives ofblack South Africans. Every day for the next two years, there was invariably a
protester or protesters marching in the front of the Embassy who stood up for the rights of
black South Africans even if it meant being arrested. The picketing over the next two
years contributed to placing South Africa under international scrutiny. Media outlets from
around the world reported on stories of the arrests in front of the Embassy. Protests in
Paris, London, Pretoria, Rome, and Brussels indicated growing hostility to the Apartheid
regime throughout the West.
In addition, the FSAM was forming a nexus on the grassroots levels. TransAfrica
had awakened protesters to utilize direct action, especially in the United States. In this
'”john Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History ofNegroAmericans (New
York: WilliamMorrow and Company, 1988), 493.
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country, social activism became popular again for the first time in years. People sought to
end this pervasive oppression in South Africa and from 1984-1985, these campaigns were
present in over 40 cities. The demonstrators targeted multinational corporations with
dealings in South Africa; consulates of South Africa; and even coin dealers who handled
the Krugerrand, South Africa’s gold coin for investors wary of the stock market. During
that crucial year, the arrests of demonstrators swelled to around 4,500 or more in
solidarity with people in the other parts of the world, particularly in London and black
South Africa. The FSAM was contributing to the isolation of the South African
government because of its ability to solidify support from many sectors. In
acknowledging and exposing the killing of unarmed men, women, and children in the
townships of South Africa, the global movement was able to present a moral justification
for the protests against the daily repression that black South Africans experienced. Of
course, the worldwide media broadcast an extensive range of information about the
deteriorating conditions in South Africa and about the protests, which average citizens
were exposed to on a nightly basis.
On college and university campuses in the United States, students picketed the
board of trustees’ meetings; students held sit-ins in; they held rallies for Nelson Mandela
and other political prisoners. They demanded that colleges divest their stock holdings
in South African companies and insisted that the leadership of colleges and universities
acknowledge the anti-humanistic policies of Apartheid. Demonstrations were often
planned by student groups in concert with the FSAM, which was in turn under the
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leadership umbrella of TransAfrica. By including students in the movement, TransAfrica
had developed another instrument of leverage.
More importantly, social activism in the U.S. was reinforced by activism in other
parts of the world. Protesters were inspired and moved at the courage of black South
Africans who endured senseless shooting, mass arrests, and a state of emergency called
for by President Botha in 1985. These horrifying scenes were broadcast into the homes of
Londoners and Americans nightly. In that same year, 1985, 50,000 protesters marched in
London in opposition to the visit of South African President P.W. Botha. Other civil
disobedience actions took place. For example, in South Africa, the townships of the Vaal
Triangle initiated a rental strike. In London, people boycotted goods from South Africa
and it was estimated that 33% of all consumers refused to purchase products from South
Africa. The protests in London boasted participants from the ranks ofboth rich and poor
citizens. Because of detentions and mass incarcerations around the world, a new
leadership emerged in South Africa. This new leadership was the United Democratic
Front (UDF) and the Congress of South Africa Students (COSAS), the latter of which
looked for direction from the UDF. Although UDF utilized non-violent strategies such as
boycotts of schools, Afrikaner businesses, and public strikes, the use of violence was not
ruled out. UDF tactics were fundamentally targeted to create chaos so that the South
African government could not govern under such conditions. David McKean asserts:
UDF leaders do not publicly condone violence, but it plays a significant role in
their strategy. Publicly, they have laid out a strategy that includes a general strike,
boycott of white business, and boycott of black schools. Taken together these
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tactics are designed to make South Africa ungovernable—an objective touted by
the ANC.'"''
In order for this strategy to be successful, UDF concentrated on black South Africans
who came from the “poorest section of the South African economy.” This sector of the
community was extremely repressed by the South Africa government. Despite their
status, however, they were “nearly 50 percent ofall private consumers spending.’”*® UDF
recognized that black South Africans had an underestimated but powerful buying power
that could theoretically affect the overall economy were it intelligently applied. UDF
suggested boycotts, the focus ofwhich centered on the cities of Port Elizabeth and East
London. The boycotts resulted in a 40 % downward spiral in retail sales and led to
boycotts in major cities such as Capetown and Pretoria. The location of the boycotts was
strategic since UDF organized around places in the townships where unemployment was
high and black South Africans, according to UDF’s assessment, did not have “anything to
lose.”'*’
The UDF persuaded students to form the Congress of South African Students
(COSAS) under its leadership. The students would prove to be effective and vigorous.
They boycotted schools and refiased to attend class. The courage ofCOSAS inspired





adults to fight for their freedom; this opposition in South Africa against Apartheid was
definitely different than it had been in the past. Under the guidance of the UDF, COSAS
had energized adult involvement. This involvement was not part of the anti-Apartheid
movement in 1976. David McKean later says:
It is, in fact, the students who have responded most vigorously to the UDF. In
1984, in protest of the proposed constitutional reforms, an estimated 800,000
stayed away from classes. Since that time, hundreds of schools have been closed
by the government. The authorities have also detained thousands of student
leaders and have banned the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), an
affiliate of the UDF and one of the principal organizers of the township protest.
These measures have not, however, brought the violence under control; they may
even have galvanized adult blacks into active protest. Louis Le Grange, the
Minister ofPolice, has claimed that what sets the current violence apart from that
in 1976 is the widespread participation by adults.’^*
Eventually, some would say belatedly, U.S. members of Congress noted with
interest the worldwide protest movements against the South African government. Some
even joined in the activities sponsored by TransAffica. In the House ofRepresentatives,
two prominent members of the Black Caucus who participated were Congressmen Julian
Dixon and Ron Dellums, both ofwhom were incarcerated. All of the members of the
Black Caucus were arrested except two, and they elected to go to jail anyway in defiance
of the Apartheid policies of South Africa. The white Senator Lowell Weicker was the
first U.S. Senator in history to act in opposition to the South African government and was
immediately arrested in front of the South African Embassy. Reverend Jesse Jackson and
activist Harry Belafonte, among others, made impassioned pleas for congressional action
and the response was positive, if gradual.
158‘Ibid.,43.
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As the FSAM protests continued, more prominent citizens joined in acts of civil
disobedience and with the guidance of TransAffica, the movement spread to large cities
like Detroit, New York, and Los Angeles and such smaller cities as Highland Park,
Michigan and Annapolis, Maryland. Protestors were seen handcuffed together during the
nightly news. Those participating in the protests now included members of the American
Bar Association and the National Urban League. Some of the prominent people included
Douglas and Rory Kennedy arrested at the South African Embassy. In addition, the
FSAM received the support and prayers of some clergymen who traveled by bus from the
Midwest and marched in protest in front of the South African embassy. The widow of
Martin Luther King Jr., Coretta Scott King, was arrested at the South African Embassy,
along with her children, Martin, Yolanda, and Bernice.
These protests continued daily, despite the weather. Demonstrators (prominent
and average citizens alike) marched daily in the rain, sleet, cold, and sweltering heat.
They were a diverse group of social activists being arrested together in a global struggle
to remove the shackles of Apartheid. Increasingly, actors such as Paul Newman and Tony
Randall became involved. As the campaign continued, they could be counted among
thousands who participated in marches staged at the State Department and the Embassy.
In August of 1985, labor leaders, Jesse Jackson, and major Civil Rights leaders staged a
mock funeral in front of the State Department in protest of President Reagan’s policy of
constructive engagement. In January of 1986, an international campaign was launched
against the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation. Under the leadership of TransAfrica, the
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FSAM assembled civil rights organizations, religious, and labor organizations to protest
Shell’s continuous business alliance with the racist South Africa government.
Finally, in 1986, national legislative action was seriously considered regarding
sanctions against South Africa and in both the House ofRepresentatives and the Senate,
there were South Africa-related measures that filled the dockets. These measures
reflected a punitive spirit pervasive throughout Congress and a tacit acknowledgement
that Apartheid as a government-endorsed policy was becoming obsolete. For the first
time since the call of sanctions had been introduced in 1959, they were receiving serious
attention from Congress.
Now, TransAfrica was working in concert with members of Congress. From the
House ofRepresentatives, Congressmen Mickey Leland, Steven Solarz, Walter Fauntroy,
Howard Wolpe, George Crockett, William Gray, and Merv Dymally were crafting
divestment legislation in weekly sessions with Senator Edward Kennedy. Along with
Senator Kennedy, Senators Paul Sarbanes, Christopher Dodd, Carl Levin, and Alan
Cranston were present. On the Republican side. Senator Lowell Weicker, the majority
leader, represented the majority party. His leadership proved to be invaluable because he
built bridges between Republicans and Democrats. Also in attendance were Senators
Nancy Kassenbaum and Richard Lugar. These parties fostered a sense of bipartisanism
that was broad in support for Congressional sanctions as a means to dismantle Apartheid.
Robinson was invited to help in the wording of the anti-Apartheid bill. He states:
The legislative wheels had begun to turn as well with a clutch of punitive
measures filed in both houses of Congress. At least weekly, we would meet with
members of Congress to discuss legislative strategy. Many of these sessions were
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held in Senator Edward Kennedy’s office. Usually attending from the Senate
would be, in addition to Kennedy, Democrats Alan Cranston, Paul Sarbanes,
Christopher Dodd, and Carl Levin. Lowell Weicker attended as a bridge to the
Senate’s Republican majority leadership notably Richard Lugar and Nancy
Kassenbaum. Attending from the House would be Congressman Fauntroy,
Mickey Leland, Steven Solarz, Merv Dymally, George Crockett, William Gray,
and Howard Wolpe. Congressional support for sanctions of relative severity had
become broad and bipartisan. Perhaps the sign of a shift that would bode ill for
the white regime in Pretoria came soon after the initial embassy arrests in a letter
from House Republicans to Prime Minister Botha demanding an end to Apartheid.
In 1986, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 was enacted. However,
President Reagan utilized his power to veto the bill. The House ofRepresentatives, acting
on what was seen as a moral imperative, was able to override the veto on September 29,
1986. Now the bill went back to the Republican Senate, which also overrode the
President’s veto (78-22) on October 2^ of the same year. The sanctions approved by
America influenced the European Community and British Commonwealth to pass similar
measures.
Transnational banking institutions such as Chase, Hanover Trust, Wells Fargo &
Company, Mellon Bank, Marine Midland, Barclays Bank, Chartered Security Pacific,
First National Bank ofBoston, Citicorp, and Irving Trust Company denied credit to
corporations and banks in South Africa. These actions curtailed the amount of credit to
companies due, in large part, to the mobilization of activists by TransAfrica to target
Transnational Banks (TNB’s). Michael Martin writes:
A review reveals that the U.S. anti-Apartheid movement played a significant role
in the development of South Africa’s credit crisis. Press reports of interviews with
^^^'RandaXS.'R.ohmsoD., Defending The Spirit A Black Life In y4/»en'ca (New York: Penguin Group, 1998), 159-160.
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bank and corporate executives indicate that the anti-apartheid movement was
especially a factor in the U S. TNBs’ decision to curtail credit to South African
banks and corporations. The pressure increasingly mounted by anti-Apartheid
groups, during the development of the credit crisis, was a factor in the
determination of TNBs’ decision not to renew lines of credit to the private-sector,
and to reduce their shareholdings in South African banks. And, contrary to the
skeptics and the critics of divestment and disinvestment, the anti-apartheid
movement, in the aggregate, is in the context of the escalating political struggle in
South Africa, becoming an effective instrument for change in TNBs’ MNC’s,
U.S. and Western European governments’ policies toward South Africa.'*®
Moreover, at this stage of the anti-Apartheid movement, the leadership of TransAfrica
had begun to target worldwide financial markets, causing capital resource losses in
excess of “2 to 3 billion in total dollars.”'*' The anti-Apartheid movement was beginning
to see the fhiits of protests. Now, all Congress was left to do was pass legislation to
dismember Apartheid politically. Without the financial support of international banks and
investment from corporations. Apartheid was irreparably crippled. In the House of
Representatives and the Senate, punitive legislation against South Africa was awaiting
the president’s signature. The mobilization of protesters locally, nationally, and globally
gathered under one banner, and TransAfrica contributed to the struggle both in the United
States and abroad. The combination of the mobilization of activists around the world and
legislative action were the major forces that ended the oppressive system of Apartheid.
The role of black South Africans in making the country ungovernable was crucial. The
death knell of Apartheid had been sounded through the combined efforts of TransAfrica,
South Africans, organizations, students. Congressmen, and women. Transnational banks
‘**Michael Martin, “The South African Credit Crisis of 1985,’Tn3?is4/Hca Forum, 7, 3, (Fall), 24-27.
‘*'lbid.
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had undergirded the South Africa economy over the years. Now, investments were placed
in less chaotic and controversial economies, making the existence of the Apartheid




TransAfrica contributed to the anti-Apartheid movement by mobilizing in the
U S. and by encouraging and supporting a worldwide response from countries in Africa,
Europe, North America, South America, and Asia. The African American community
deserves special recognition for its part in supporting legislation directed at ending forty-
five years of Apartheid in South Africa, from 1948-1993. TransAfrica worked in tandem
with the ANC, Pan-African Congress, United Democratic Front, and AZAPO.
TransAfrica executed strategies along with established civil and human rights
organizations in the U S; the NAACP, SCLC, AFL-CIO, Washington Office on Africa,
and America Committee on Africa that led to the dismantling of Apartheid in South
Africa. To measure TransAfrica’s effectiveness in foreign affairs, one can examine the
legislation that was passed to divest corporations of their holdings in that country. The
passage of H.R. 1580 in 1986 resulted in a monumental trade embargo against South
Africa affecting oil, gas, coal, and other imports. Along with the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1988, these acts of legislation were the culmination of protests,
boycotts, and public awareness campaigns that TransAfrica waged against the oppressors
of black South Afiicans. TransAfrica was instrumental in helping end Apartheid in South
Africa.
This thesis utilizes the descriptive case study to explore the extent lobbying and
mobilization of activists by TransAfrica contributed to the struggle to dismantle
Apartheid in South Africa. It also tested the hypothesis that TransAfrica made significant
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contributions to the anti-Apartheid movement both domestically and internationally from
1977-1986 and thereby helped to dismantle Apartheid in South Africa. In addition, this
thesis utilizes the independent variables of lobbying and mobilization to show the reader
that TransAfrica made meaningful contributions to the anti-Apartheid movement in the
U.S. and abroad. “Mobilization of bias” is a means of exerting influence. It is the ability
to marshal resources and opinions in an effective manner. As a result of much effort,
major television networks, radio stations and newspapers gave daily coverage to
demonstrations or protests at the South African Embassy. Also, issues or policies relating
to Apartheid in South Africa received local, national, and international attention from the
press. Second, the effectiveness and success of the contributions TransAfrica made to the
anti-Apartheid movement is reflected in its ability to increase membership from seven in
1977 to 10,000 members worldwide by 1986. A third measure of success was
epitomized by the number of protests, boycotts, and demonstrations that took place
around the world. The final factor in determining the success and effectiveness of
TransAfrica to organize against South Africa’s repressive government is the successfiil
gamering of votes on key legislation designed to pressure South Africa to adopt a more
democratic government.
TransAfrica had three aims when it was established in 1977. The first aim was to
change the direction of U.S. foreign policy in South Africa and make certain a sanctions
bill was passed. The second aim was to arouse the public, students, local governments,
media, organizations, and unions and motivate them to protest against the inhumane
conditions black South Africans endured because of the U.S. foreign policy. The third
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aim was for TransAfrica to become a viable lobbying organization for the interests of
Africa and Caribbean. Mobilization of public opinion and lobbying became the two
components relevant to changing the course of U.S. foreign policy in South Africa and
subsequently ending Apartheid. These two elements would be key factors in the passage
of the first Comprehensive Act against South Africa and in changing the course ofU.S.
foreign policy toward South Africa. This thesis contends that TransAfrica contributed to
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